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This thesis identifies the conditions under which and quantifies how much 
society gains from integrating demand response directly into wholesale electricity 
markets and the level of participation that will bring about these improvements.  
Furthermore, it identifies the conditions under which the bulk power system is made 
more reliable through the participation of demand response and the inducements 
necessary to achieve this improvement.  To accomplish these goals, an econometric 
representation of New York’s wholesale electricity markets’ supply curves is 
developed in order to understand exactly how changes in load affect price. 
Economic demand response is very sensitive to locational differences in the 
bulk power system.  The simulations undertaken illustrate how a significant amount of 
demand response is needed in Western NY to generate a positive change in net social 
welfare, under rather extreme conditions, whereas very little must be relied upon in 
New York City and Long Island, under much more reasonable circumstances.  From a 
reliability standpoint, demand response can play a vital role in accurately maintaining 
reserve margins provided the payment or tariff rate is allowed to fluctuate given the 
quantity of reserves needed.  When a fixed rate is instead used, the reliability benefits 
from load curtailments are almost always less than the costs to achieve them.     iii
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
The recent creation of wholesale electricity markets and the movement away 
from vertically integrated utilities in several states across the country have created a 
series of new problems for regulators and policy-makers.  Previously, the majority of 
utilities built their own generators to serve their native load, with little interest or 
inclination to either generate and sell excess electricity to others, at a premium, or 
purchase power from cheaper alternative sources.  There were limited opportunities 
for these utilities to undertake such actions because the infrastructure to support them 
did not exist.  In addition, these utilities were relatively unconcerned if expensive units 
were needed to meet load because the costs to run and maintain them were recovered 
through their rate base.  Furthermore, state regulators required utilities to maintain 
sufficient short and long-term reserve margins, which meant capacity expansions were 
planned far enough in advance to ensure adequate reserves were always in hand.  
Since regulators allowed for full recovery of these investments via the rate-base, 
utilities were willing to undertake such costly actions.  
Under deregulated markets, where utilities no longer “serve themselves” but 
must rather turn to grid operators or long-term bilateral contracts to procure the needed 
electricity for their customers, utilities and their rate-payers are suddenly exposed to 
the volatility inherent in a wholesale market.  One need only look at the California 
experience of 2000 and 2001 to see how these new markets can be manipulated at the 
expense of utilities, many of whom have filed bankruptcy due to these events, and 
rate-payers, who have seen dramatic increases in their bills (Christopher et al. 2001).  
Utilities are also suddenly at the mercy of the marketplace to maintain reliability.   
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New generators are no longer cited and built due to government edicts, but rather 
economic forces that dictate where and when one should be built.  The lead-time 
necessary to build a base unit is substantial, with incrementally less time required for 
mid-merit and peaker units.  Expansion of the transmission system can also serve to 
increase reliability, but it too must be undertaken according to market signals.  If 
additional generation and/or transmission are not built in a timely fashion to maintain 
critical levels of reliability, the entire system can suffer catastrophic losses.  This 
system security problem is exacerbated since it is difficult to meet the exact amount of 
needed capacity through expanded transmission or constructed generation.  These 
investments can only be undertaken in the amounts that may not correspond with that 
which is needed. 
In response to these problems, there is near universal agreement that newly 
created wholesale electricity markets need the discipline and flexibility afforded by 
allowing retail customers to participate in the markets. How best to facilitate this 
participation and how to determine the optimal amount of demand response to 
promote economic efficiency, reduce price volatility, and maintain system reliability 
are, however, the subject of growing debate, the outcome of which has substantial 
consequences for the role of the Independent System Operator (ISO).    
At one extreme some argue that such customer participation should come 
through real-time pricing (RTP) services or other time-differentiated retail rates 
offered by regulated and competitive retailers. A few proponents would make RTP 
mandatory (e.g., Ruff, 2002 and Borenstein and Holland, 2003).   At the other 
extreme, some would argue that customer participation to improve wholesale market 
efficiency should be through short-run demand response (DR) programs, whereby 
customers are paid to reduce load when prices are high or when system-wide security 
is threatened. To improve market efficiency, the claim is that DR resources must be  
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evaluated on a comparable basis with generation resources for the purpose of ISO 
scheduling and dispatch operations. If programs are designed properly, DR resources 
supplement the generation portfolio during emergency situations, and, at other times, 
compete directly against generation. 
The debate over which approach is the most appropriate in large measure turns 
on the ability of customer’s to adjust electricity usage in response to price signals or 
other types of incentives. Many customers, for example, are unwilling to continually 
adjust electricity usage, as required by RTP programs, because the transactions costs 
of doing so outweigh the potential benefits.  A small portion of customers may be able 
to profitably adjust demand to real time prices (see Goldman et al., 2004, Schwartz et 
al., 2002). For these customers, the ‘transactions’ costs of demand response may be 
low because of the nature of how they use electricity, the presence of control 
technology, or access to on-site generation. These customers would be receptive to 
services whereby their electricity usage was priced at prevailing wholesale market 
prices, such as those produced by the day-ahead market administered by ISOs. If the 
RTP experience of the past dozen years is an indication, the number of customers that 
will volunteer for such service is small.
1 There are, however, indications that a third 
group exists: customers that are willing and able to respond to price, but only on a 
limited basis.
2 If there are sufficient numbers of such customers, then much of the 
                                                 
1 Clearly, if most customers were able and willing to adjust electricity usage, standard RTP programs, 
which by some are considered the economist’s first-best solution, could perhaps be implemented on a 
broad scale. However, RTP programs have seen only limited application, and most of them are not what 
economists have in mind--customer facing the market price for any and all usage -- but instead involve 
a hedge, using a two-part model, that seems to affect both their willingness to participate and to adjust 
electricity use in response to price changes.  Furthermore, according to Goldman et al. (2004), an 
analysis of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation’s (NMPC) RTP rate by Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratories and Neenan Associates, customers generally only take notice of prices when they exceed a 
certain level. Many believe that managing the risk associated with time-varying rates is too daunting, 
and subsequently have left NMPC, choosing an alternate electricity supplier willing to offer hedged 
rates.  
2 Utilities have utilized this principle to operate interruptible, curtailable and load control programs for 
the past 20 years.  
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deadweight efficiency losses associated with flat-rate tariffs may still be avoided 
through programs that compensate customers for load reductions only when prices are 
extremely high and/or when system reliability is threatened (Boisvert and Neenan, 
2003). Regardless of the current perceived ability of a customer to be price-
responsive, it may be possible to improve this ability through such simple things as 
education and outreach efforts, as well as more technical actions, like on-site demand 
response audits, and financial assistance for investments in technology specifically 
designed for this purpose (Neenan et al., 2003). 
Given the considerable uncertainty about customer acceptance of these various 
strategies that allow for customer participation in the electricity markets, it is 
important to first estimate how much demand response is needed to reach certain 
goals.  One should document and quantify the nature of the short-term social 
deadweight losses associated with the current flat-rate tariff structure, the 
inefficiencies in the wholesale electricity market due to a lack of end-use customer 
participation, and the value of load reductions in terms of the “public good” benefits 
associated with system reliability and understand the level of demand response 
required to bring about the intended benefits before designing time-differentiated retail 
rates and demand response programs as well as setting public budgets for education, 
outreach, and technology investment projects.  However, in most jurisdictions, such 
was not the case.  RTP rates and DR programs were developed with neither 
participation nor benefit goals while public institutions rapidly implemented co-
funding programs for technology investment without understanding where the money 
could be best spent.  Given the state of the world as it stands now, an analysis that 
compares where we are and where we should be is a valuable one and would 
contribute greatly to this ongoing debate.    
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The New York electricity market provides a unique opportunity to do just that 
because the NYISO currently offers three price-responsive load programs that allow 
customers to offer their curtailable load as a commodity to the wholesale market while 
Niagara Mohawk’s SC-3A rate utilizes the NYISO’s Day-Ahead Market LBMPs as 
the basis for its real-time pricing rate.
3  In the end, curtailments brought about by an 
increase in the retail price of electricity or by direct participation in the wholesale 
market provide the same net result – reduction in the wholesale price for electricity 
and increased reserve margins. 
Objectives   
Even though many (e.g. Neenan et al., 2002, Ruff, 2002, GAO, 2004) have 
made the case for why demand response is an important component of any wholesale 
electricity market, the central issues related to desired levels of participation and 
expected benefits attributable to these levels remain unresolved.  This research intends 
to: 
1.  Identify the conditions under which society gains from integrating demand 
response directly into wholesale markets and quantify the level of 
participation that will bring about these improvements; and 
2.  Identify the conditions under which the bulk power system is made more 
reliable through the participation of demand response and the inducements 
necessary to achieve this improvement. 
Thus far, there have been no comprehensive analyses to identify the amount of 
economic price responsive load needed to improve market performance significantly.  
Alison Silverstein, senior policy advisor to FERC Chairman Pat Wood III, indicated at 
the December 16
th, 2003 meeting of the PJM Demand Side Response Working Group 
                                                 
3 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) is a regulated utility in the upstate New York area.  
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that a reasonable goal of 5% of system peak should be set for demand response.  
Neenan Associates, in its 2001, 2002, and 2003 annual evaluation reports of the 
NYISO’s PRL Programs has repeatedly shown that demand response between 15% to 
25% of system peak would effectively remove all high prices from the market. 
While one reasonable objective for a program such as the NYISO’s Day-
Ahead Demand Response Program
4 or a day-ahead RTP tariff rate is price-
stabilization, a formal evaluation of the amount of economic demand response needed 
should be based on a broader criterion.  In particular, these criteria should incorporate 
the net social gain associated with customers’ demand response as compared to the 
situation where customers face a fixed tariff rate.   
With respect to reliability-based demand response programs or retail rates like 
critical peak pricing, there currently has been little to no discussion as to the “correct” 
price that will bring about the necessary reduction in load to maintain generation 
reserve margins.  Currently, both the NYISO and PJM Interconnection, LLC. have 
reliability demand response programs that pay a minimum of $500/MWh for verified 
load reductions during declared system emergency events.  This price is paid to any 
and all who participate, regardless if an overabundance or lack of resources is 
forthcoming upon declaring an event.  Instead, system operators rely on more 
location-based dispatch of programs in an attempt to more accurately equilibrate 
supply plus reserves and demand.  This latter method has proved to be relatively 
unsuccessful at correctly dispatching demand response resources, for reserve margins 
during events have either been too high or too low (see Neenan et al., 2003, Neenan et 
al., 2004).  If dispatch was instead based on the price that would induce the required 
                                                 
4 DADRP is a NYISO demand response program whereby end-use customers bid in their curtailable 
load on equivalent terms with generators into the Day-Ahead Market.  If they are a cheaper alternative 
to a generator, then the DADRP curtailment is scheduled for the following day.  Failure to comply with 
scheduled load reductions requires settlement at the higher of the Real-Time Market or Day-Ahead 
Market location-based marginal price (LBMP).  
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level of demand response to be shed from the system, load could be brought back 
exactly to what was needed to maintain reserve margins – the most efficient outcome 
possible.  A similar argument holds for the case of critical peak pricing, whereby the 
retail rate is increased substantially during a limited number of hours to induce 
reductions in electricity due to system emergencies. 
Methodology 
An important principle to guide the evaluation of ideal levels of economic 
demand response will be in terms of the social welfare analysis developed by Boisvert 
and Neenan (2003).  The theory states that customers facing a fixed tariff will tend to 
over-consume electricity in comparison to the case where they actually pay the 
wholesale price for electricity.  Such misallocation of resources causes a loss to 
society since the commodity could be more efficiently used.  Some if not all of the 
societal loss can be offset with curtailments scheduled through wholesale economic 
demand response programs, like DADRP, when the payment to customers for 
curtailing load is smaller than the cost of resource misallocation they negate.  This is 
the basis for evaluation and the yardstick by which program performance will be 
measured. 
Demand response to be used in improving system security must be evaluated 
differently from the short-term welfare analysis associated with improving market 
efficiency.  Consistent and reliable delivery of electricity to a firm is a necessity for 
overall profit maximization.  When outages occur, productivity is lost resulting in 
costs to the firm.  These costs can be exacerbated if the unexpected loss of electricity 
results in damage to production equipment or the prolonged absence of electricity 
causes spoilage or other harm to a firm’s inputs or outputs.   The inability of those 
helping to improve the security of the overall bulk power grid to capture all the  
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benefits of doing so will result in an underinvestment in such resources (Nicholson, 
1998).  Without some sort of public intervention, in the form of increased payment 
rates for load curtailments during system emergencies or the restructuring of retail 
rates to indicate the increased cost of energy and reliability, to strongly induce 
reductions in demand during a limited number of hours, there will always be an 
undersupply of load curtailments in response to public appeals for conservation when 
reserves are short.  In addition, the long history most rate payers have with flat-rate 
tariffs has resulted in a lack of knowledge about their curtailment capability.  Thus, 
some public funding of education, training and equipment investment is warranted in 
the early years of these programs or else society will further under supply load 
curtailments during times of system emergency if left in private hands. 
This analysis expands importantly on the work previously performed (e.g. 
Neenan et al. 2002, Neenan et al. 2003, and Neenan et al. 2004).  Specifically:   
1.  Short-term supply curves must be estimated to calculate the market effects 
of demand response.  Embodied in these supply curves are variables that 
fundamentally alter the relationship between load and price and are used to 
reflect differences in system conditions.  These variables have heretofore 
been assumed to be exogenous to the system.  This analysis builds an 
analytical structure to avoid this endogeneity problem. 
2.  In addition, the relationships between the Day-Ahead and Real-Time 
markets is evaluated and more thoroughly integrated into the estimated 
models than has previously been performed to better represent the two 
markets.  This analysis also provides an understanding into the effects an 
economic day-ahead demand response program would have on the both the 
forward and spot markets for electricity.    
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These estimated models are used to simulate the effects of different participation rates 
in areas of New York State.  The simulations estimate, for the summer of 2001, what 
amount of demand response is needed to equate program payments with the reduction 
in the deadweight loss, as well as calculate the price at which emergency program 
participants should be paid and/or CPP rates should be set to ensure reserve margins 
are never violated.  Recent research by Goldman et al. (2004) will be used to represent 
likely demand response in the markets. 
Overview 
There are several areas in which this analysis is unique from others where 
similar work has been undertaken.  First, the representation of the day-ahead and real-
time market supply curves, which has traditionally been modeled separately, will be 
integrated together to more accurately represent the markets and their respective 
outcomes.  Second, many of the things that are assumed to influence the market 
supply curves have heretofore been assumed exogenous to the system.  For example, 
load was not previously assumed to influence congestion on the bulk power system.  
This analysis intends to use an instrumental variable approach to help remove any 
simultaneity problems the models may have.  Finally, the simulations to quantify the 
optimal level of demand response that is social welfare improving and the optimal 
price for demand response that maintains system reserve margins has not been 
performed before. 
To serve these goals, this document is laid as follows.  First, since this research 
focuses on the New York State experience, the history of the State’s electricity grid 
and efforts to better manage it are discussed in Chapter 2.  A summary of the data to 
be used in the analysis is also included in Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 discusses the theory 
that serves as the foundation for the subsequent welfare and pricing analysis.  In  
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Chapter 4, both the econometric and production theory that underlies the estimation of 
short-term supply curves is discussed, as well as the results of the modeling efforts 
undertaken. Chapter 5 develops simulation methodology to be used in assessing the 
optimal amount of demand response for deriving positive net social welfare benefits 
and the necessary price levels to elicit the exact quantity of demand response to 
maintain grid reserve margins. Finally, Chapter 6 contains a discussion of the policy 
implications of the analysis. 11 
CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS  
AND ANALYSIS DATA 
 
Now that a basic outline of the work contained in this thesis has been 
presented, a discussion of the markets to be analyzed and the data to be used in this 
analysis is appropriate.  Specifically, this chapter summarizes both the history of the 
New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and the control area in which the 
subsequent analysis is performed, and describes the operations of the NYISO.  This 
discussion focuses on its energy markets and how they relate to one other, and 
provides a description of the data collected from the NYISO for use in the analysis.
1 
Brief History of Events Leading to the Creation of the New York Independent 
System Operator 
On November 9, 1965 at 5:16 p.m., a single transmission line at the Niagara 
Falls generating station tripped off-line and cascaded into one of the worst blackouts 
in U.S. history – leaving close to 30 million people without electricity for as long as 
13 hours.  Five other nearby transmission lines rapidly became overloaded and 
subsequently tripped, isolating the 1,800 MW output of the Niagara Station.  The 
instability associated with such a large unexpected loss of generation on the bulk 
power system caused other nearby generators to become unstable and trip off, causing 
the downward spiral to begin in earnest.  After only 4 seconds, the majority of the 
northeast power system had become so unstable that it separated into five isolated 
power systems, with “islands” being created throughout New York, Ontario, most of 
New England, and parts of New Jersey and Maryland.  Most of these islands went 
totally black within 5 minutes, as system operators were unable to balance supply and 
load, maintain frequency and support voltage.  By 5:21 p.m., large portions of the 
                                                 
1 The data used in this analysis is all publicly available from the NYISO website, www.nyiso.com.   12
northeastern United States and Canada were without electricity (Northeast Blackout of 
1965, 2004). 
Later that same evening, President Lyndon Johnson ordered a Federal 
investigation into why such a rapid and complete system failure had occurred and 
what could be done to avoid such a catastrophic event from occurring again (The 
Great Northeast Blackout of 1965, 2004).  The report found that there was little 
coordination between the different transmission districts that incumbent utilities 
owned, operated and maintained.  This lack of communications and operating 
protocols could be only rectified with more centralized dispatch and oversight 
(Northeast Blackout of 1965, 2004). 
To address the specific problems cited in the report, the major regulated 
utilities in New York State banded together in 1966 to create the New York Power 
Pool (NYPP) in order to coordinate the bulk transmission system that was owned and 
operated by these entities, in hopes of avoiding future major supply interruptions.  The 
NYPP was created with almost a communal sense to it, as each utility provided the 
staff who worked towards the collective goal of safe and reliable operation of New 
York state’s power grid.  To help meet this goal, the NYPP opened a spot market for 
electricity in which utilities that did not have sufficient generation of their own to 
cover demands, or found cheaper alternatives to their own plants elsewhere on the 
grid, could purchase electricity from other utilities.  This represented a big step 
forward in the evolution of electricity markets (New York Market Orientation Course, 
2001). 
Over the subsequent 30 years, the New York Power Pool continued to operate 
the bulk power system safely and reliably, with little expansion to its mandate.  
However, with the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 
1978 by Congress, an independent power market was created, allowing merchant   13
generation facilities to be built while requiring the NYPP and utilities elsewhere to 
open the doors such that these generators could be utilized within the framework of 
the bulk power network.   
The process of unbundling the different components of the electricity industry 
was given a further push in 1992 when Congress passed the Energy Policy Act, with 
subsequent rulings by FERC, Orders 888 and 889, in 1996.  Wholesale sellers of 
electricity were, for the first time, guaranteed non-discriminatory access to the 
interstate transmission grid.  Such actions set the stage for deregulation at the state 
level. 
The New York State Public Service Commission (NYPSC) began the process 
of deregulating the state’s electricity market in 1996.  In response to federal orders 
advocating the creation of regional transmission operators (i.e. Independent System 
Operators) to coincide with electricity deregulation, New York seemed a perfect place 
to make the transition easily to this new paradigm as the NYPP already had three 
decades of experience in coordinating and operating the grid (New York Market 
Orientation Course, 2001).   
The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) replaced the NYPP in 
November of 1998.  The NYISO is a non-profit organization whose mission is to: 1) 
ensure the reliable, safe and efficient operation of the State’s major transmission 
system; and 2) administer an open, competitive, and non-discriminatory wholesale 
market for electricity.  Currently, the NYISO serves 18.2 million consumers with a 
system peak demand of 30,333 MW (June, 2003) and is responsible for dispatching 
over 360 generating units across the control area (NYISO Homepage, 2004).  To meet 
its charter, the NYISO created, governs, and operates both a day-ahead forward 
market and real-time spot market for electricity, operating reserves, and regulation; a 
capacity market that is run every month as well as once every six months; and a   14
monthly transmission congestion market (New York Market Orientation Course, 
2001). For purposes of this evaluation, the primary focus is on the NYISO’s electricity 
markets.   
The markets for electricity are comprised of two main entities: generators and 
load serving entities (LSEs).  Because of the way deregulation evolved in New York 
State, the incumbent utilities were required to divest themselves of the majority of 
their physical generating facilities.  The vertically integrated monopolies were broken 
apart into two separate companies: one to provide distribution of the electric 
commodity to end-use customers (i.e. LSEs) and one to produce the electricity 
demanded by consumers (i.e. generators).
2    Long-term contracts could be negotiated 
between the two entities, but the nature of the competitive profit-driven environment 
in which the generation side suddenly found itself meant that “sweetheart” deals were 
a thing of the past.  LSEs could either negotiate bilateral contracts to procure the 
necessary energy to cover their electricity needs or enter the wholesale electricity 
markets provided by the NYISO.     
NYISO’s Day-Ahead Market 
The NYISO opreates a forward market each day for all 24 hours of the 
following day where a resulting contract obligates the holder to buy (sell) electricity 
from that specific location on the grid at the indicated price.  Load Serving Entities 
(LSEs) submit bids to purchase electricity while generators submit offers to supply it 
by 5 A.M. when the market closes.
3 The NYISO incorporates these bids into its 
Security Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC), a complex constrained optimization 
                                                 
2 The distribution system remains regulated by the state because of its “natural” monopoly 
characteristic. 
3 Recently, financial institutions (i.e. traders) have been allowed into the marketplace through the 
introduction of virtual bidding.  Virtual supply offers and load bids are incorporated into the market on 
equal and identical footing as physical bids, being settled at the real-time market-clearing price.   15
algorithm, that minimizes the production cost to serve load over the entire 24 hours by 
matching the supply offers with demand bids, subject to a host of physical system 
constraints.
4   The last unit scheduled to serve load sets the posted market-clearing 
price for each hour.  
In a system of this magnitude, SCUC is asked to solve for the optimal unit 
commitment of an incredibly complex system in less than 6 hours.  In so doing, SCUC 
must take into account the limitations of the bulk transmission system, which acts like 
a highway system.  When there is a small amount of load, the system runs freely with 
no constraints.  However, as load begins to rise, the system becomes more and more 
congested.  Bottlenecks appear where the transmission capacity of the grid is 
insufficient to move the electricity from one side of an interface to another. When this 
occurs, the less expensive generator whose electricity is unable to get to where it is 
needed must be backed down, while a more expensive unit on the other side of the 
constraint is ramped up to serve load.  This way of managing congestion is manifest in 
the NYISO’s locational-based marginal pricing (LBMP) methodology.  Prices can be 
dramatically different across the system when it becomes congested.  In fact, once on 
June 13
th, 2001 and again in a single hour on June 29
th, 2001 the LBMP in the DAM 
was over 5 times higher on Long Island than it was in Central New York. 
SCUC’s ability to schedule generators is also confounded by the physical and 
financial restrictions of these units.  All units require some amount of notice of when 
their electricity will be needed.  In most cases, the time when DAM schedules are 
posted (by 11 A.M.) for the following day is ample notice.  However, there are some 
units that have very long start-up times, requiring in some cases days to bring the unit 
on-line in time for when it might be needed.  A generator may also submit to the 
                                                 
4 In some cases the market has an even longer-term view of the world – looking out two to three days in 
order to ensure ample generation can be on-line when it might be needed in the near future.   16
NYISO a minimum run time requirement that restricts how quickly a unit can be 
turned off once it has been energized with the system, as well as a minimum down 
time that limits how quickly a unit can be expected to re-energize once shut down.  On 
the financial side, generators are also able to submit several different components of 
their energy bids.  Start-up costs are incurred every time a unit is turned on, but are 
submitted separately from the marginal energy costs, which represent the costs to 
generate one more MWh of electricity.
5  SCUC must incorporate all of these specifics 
into its constraint matrix to find the least cost solution to the unit commitment 
problem. 
The NYISO uses the previous two elements of SCUC to help set LBMP at the 
lowest cost unit to meet one more MW of load.  However, this algorithm also ensures 
there is ample generation for the load forecast to be demanded in the spot market, 
which may be very different from what is bid into the DAM.  Thus, once the LBMP’s 
in the DAM have been set, SCUC re-dispatches components of the bulk power system 
based on forecasts of spot market demands.  The results of this “reliability pass” 
provide some generators with schedules that would not be needed to meet DAM bid 
load.  The NYISO does this, in part, because of the limited time-horizon it has in the 
Real-Time Market.  Thus, the results of the DAM are directly incorporated into the 
RTM. 
NYISO’s Real-Time Market 
Since DAM contracts need not cover 100% of an LSEs obligations nor a 
generators output, the difference between what is actually consumed (supplied) and 
what was contracted for is bought (sold) at the market-clearing price in the NYISO’s 
                                                 
5 The start-up cost is a one-time fixed cost, but the marginal energy cost can vary over the range of the 
generating stations capacity.  The NYISO allows units to submit several different bid blocks that must 
be monotonically increasing as more and more capacity is offered into the marketplace, with a market 
cap of $1000/MWh.   17
Real-Time Market (RTM).
6  For security reasons, this market must instantaneously 
balance demand and supply based on the state of the grid at that time and submitted 
generator offers.  As with its day-ahead counterpart, the Security Constrained Dispatch 
(SCD) derives the least-cost solution to serving load in real-time subject to a host of 
reliability, physical and financial constraints.  However, in this market, a near-optimal 
solution is achieved before the algorithm is even run by using the results of the DAM.  
Through incorporating schedules from SCUC, SCD is able to find the cost minimizing 
dispatch in less than 5 minutes. 
Unlike SCUC, SCD must deal with the unexpected in real-time.  The loss of a 
transmission line is incorporated into the Day-Ahead Market when it is known in 
advance, allowing for the least cost unit commitment.  However, if the same line were 
to trip offline, it must be instantaneously dealt with in the spot market. SCD has 
neither the flexibility nor the time horizon to substantially re-dispatch the system when 
contingencies occur.  The algorithm and its operators must make relatively short-run 
decisions to ensure reliable operation of the grid.  Thus, events that may have a small 
effect on the outcome of the DAM could cause dramatic changes in the RTM. 
Similarly, if the load appears substantially higher or lower than was planned 
for and committed against in the DAM, SCD must take extraordinary actions to ensure 
supply and demand are instantaneously met.  If SCD is unable to react quickly 
enough, the system’s reliability could be jeopardized because not enough (too much) 
electricity and voltage is being produced to meet the very stringent specifications of 
most electricity consuming devices.  Incredibly small sags in voltage can have 
catastrophic consequences for the system.  Thus, it becomes crucial for the load to be 
                                                 
6 The NYISO’s Hour-Ahead Market (i.e. Balancing Market Evaluator or BME) only produces binding 
schedules and contracts for external transactions.  In general, its function is to serve as the intermediary 
between the forward-looking Day-Ahead Market, and the Real-Time market concerned with the state of 
the grid over the next 5 minutes.     18
forecasted as accurately as possible, so the right mix of generation located in the right 
places on the bulk power system can be committed to in the DAM such that these real-
time events can be avoided. 
Summary Data on Demand and LBMPs in the DAM and RTM  
To gain a better understanding into the nature of the two markets operated by 
the NYISO and appreciate the empirical specification for the zonal short-run supply 
models to be described below, a brief discussion of zonal demand and prices is 
required.   
The NYISO created 11 pricing zones to correspond roughly with the different 
service territories of the State’s Transmission Owners (TOs).  Figure 2-1 shows the 
location of these zones in the State.  However, a close analysis of the zonal LBMP 
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Figure 2.1: Map of the NYISO Control Area   19
data reveals that not all 11 NYISO pricing zones are significantly different.   
To simplify the discussion and analysis below, four “superzones” can be 
created to adequately represent the entire system.  In general, all zones West of the 
Total East transmission constraint see nearly identical prices.  Zones A - E are rarely 
congested and therefore most likely exhibit a common short-run supply curve.  These 
zones, aggregated together in this fashion, are hereafter referred to as the Western NY 
superzone.  On the other side of this major constraint, lies a series of transmission 
interfaces as electricity flows down the Hudson River towards New York City and 
Long Island.  The four zones (F – I) that electricity must pass through do exhibit 
substantially greater differences in prices than those in Western NY, but they are still 
similar enough during the majority of the time to warrant grouping them together.  
This region is called the Hudson River superzone.  Finally, the two largest load zones 
of the State, New York City and Long Island, are modeled separately.
7 
During the early part of 2000, the NYISO experienced some rather significant 
price spikes necessitating the imposition of price caps.
8  To be sure, many of the 
challenges the NYISO faced in its opening summer were due in large part to 
inexperience with the “new” wholesale electricity market.  This analysis focuses on 
the summer of 2001 (i.e. June, July and August), the second summer the NYISO was 
in operation, because it is assumed that the majority of the market’s initial problems 
had been resolved, yet market prices still showed substantial variation.  
                                                 
7 The NYISO does not publish load data for New York City and Long Island separately but in 
aggregate, due to an agreement worked out between Consolidated Edison, the Long Island Power 
Authority and the NYISO.  For this analysis, it will be assumed that NYC load comprises 79% of the 
joint DAM load purchases, and 66% of combined Real-Time metered load.  Clearly, this ratio fluctuates 
day-by-day, and even hour-by-hour, but this is the best approximation at this time. 
8 There were several days in May and June of 2000 when prices rose in excess of $1000/MWh.  Both 
FERC and the NYISO felt such prices did not adequately represent competitive market outcomes and 
moved to impose a price cap in hopes of ensuring more competitive behavior during times of tight 
supply conditions.    20
Furthermore, this analysis focuses only on weekday afternoon hours (1:00 p.m. 
through 7:00 p.m.).  These are the hours when the majority of load is on the system.  
Figures 2-2 through 2-5 show for each of the areas delineated for separate analysis the 
minimum, average and maximum demand by hour in both the DAM and in the RTM.  
Clearly, the load peaks sometime in the middle of the afternoon and trails off 
relatively evenly in either direction.   
This high load also usually corresponds with the period of highest prices.  As 
illustrated in Figures 2-6 through 2-13 for both the DAM and the RTM, average prices 
rise slowly, peaking sometime in the early afternoon, and then falling back as the day 
progresses.  The maximum price varies considerably by hour, with the majority of the 
highest priced hours in the afternoon.  Given that a focus of this analysis is to discern 
the level of demand response that would generate positive net social welfare benefits, 
it is exactly these highest priced hours that would be expected to elicit the majority of 
economic load curtailments.   
A careful analysis of Figures 2-2 – 2-13 indicates that the market during the 
weekday afternoon hours is functionally different than during other parts of the day.  
To represent the supply curve, aggregating all hours together could present problems 
with econometric modeling of these markets due to observed structural discontinuities 
across the different blocks of hours.     21
 
Figure 2.2: Average Hourly Zonal Load for Western NY Superzone (Summer 
Weekdays) 
Figure 2.3: Average Hourly Zonal Load for Hudson River Superzone (Summer 
Weekdays)   22
 
Figure 2.4: Average Hourly Zonal Load for New York City (Summer Weekdays) 
Figure 2.5: Average Hourly Zonal Load for Long Island (Summer Weekdays)   23
Figure 2.6: Hourly DAM LBMP Statistics for Western NY Superzone (Summer 
Weekdays)
Figure 2.7: Hourly RTM LBMP Statistics for Western NY Superzone (Summer 
Weekday Only)  24
 
Figure 2.8: Hourly DAM LBMP Statistics for Hudson River Superzone (Summer 
Weekdays)
Figure 2.9: Hourly RTM LBMP Statistics for Hudson River Superzone (Summer 
Weekdays)  25
 
Figure 2.10: Hourly DAM LBMP Statistics for New York City (Summer 
Weekdays)
Figure 2.11: Hourly RTM LBMP Statistics for New York City (Summer 
Weekdays)  26
Figure 2.12: Hourly DAM LBMP Statistics for Long Island (Summer Weekdays)
Figure 2.13: Hourly RTM LBMP Statistics for Long Island (Summer Weekdays)   27
Zonal Demand and Prices 
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for demand and prices in both the DAM 
and RTM for summer weekday afternoons of 2001 for the four regions of the NYISO 
for which supply curves are to be estimated.  Demand in the Day-Ahead Market is 
defined to be the sum of the fixed bid load
9 LSEs buy in the DAM, the amount of 
price capped load bids
10 scheduled in the DAM, and the load covered through bilateral 
contracts.  RTM demand is the average of actual five-minute metered demand over the 
course of the entire hour.  To calculate the loads for the superzones, the individual 
zonal load values that comprise the superzone are added together.  The LBMPs must 
be weighted by each zone’s load to properly represent the average price paid for 
electricity in the superzone. 
As Table 2.1 illustrates, New York City has the highest overall demand bid 
into the Day-Ahead Market, averaging 7,998 MWh per hour.  Not surprisingly, NYC 
also generated the single highest observed DAM LBMP for the summer at $1,025.
11  
Similar observations can be made for the Real-Time market.  It is of interest that Long 
Island was the only region to substantially over procure in the Day-Ahead Market, 
with all other areas having had fewer MWhs bid into the DAM than materialized in 
the RTM.  This could in part be due to the method of allocating the joint NYC and 
Long Island load to their respective areas, but is relatively consistent with what was 
reported in Neenan et al. (2002). 
                                                 
9 Fixed Bid Load is load that will be purchased regardless of the price in the DAM. 
10 Price Capped Load Bids represent additional load that will come onto the system if DAM prices are 
low enough. 
11 LBMPs can be in excess of the market cap of $1,000/MWh due to line losses, which is a component 
of LBMP.   28
 
 
Statistic
DAM Load 
(MW)
DAM LBMP 
($/MW)
RTM Load 
(MW)
RTM LBMP 
($/MW)
Minimum 4,692 23 5,671 -41
Maximum 8,637 915 9,328 937
Average 6,628 60 7,646 49
Coef. Of Var. 0.11 1.29 0.10 1.20
Statistic
DAM Load 
(MW)
DAM LBMP 
($/MW)
RTM Load 
(MW)
RTM LBMP 
($/MW)
Minimum 3,165 31 3,360 16
Maximum 5,748 1,002 6,349 1,013
Average 4,249 75 4,702 72
Coef. Of Var. 0.14 1.16 0.15 1.18
Statistic
DAM Load 
(MW)
DAM LBMP 
($/MW)
RTM Load 
(MW)
RTM LBMP 
($/MW)
Minimum 5,723 39 6,595 17
Maximum 10,544 1,025 12,247 1,071
Average 7,998 84 9,339 86
Coef. Of Var. 0.12 1.05 0.12 1.32
Statistic
DAM Load 
(MW)
DAM LBMP 
($/MW)
RTM Load 
(MW)
RTM LBMP 
($/MW)
Minimum 2,948 36 1,753 27
Maximum 5,432 831 3,255 1,060
Average 4,120 86 2,482 109
Coef. Of Var. 0.12 0.89 0.12 0.98
*Loads for these two zones are only published jointly.  79% of the 
combined DAM load was allocated to NYC, with a 66% allocation in 
RTM.
Table 2-1: Summary Statistics for Hourly LBMP and Load by Superzone 
(Summer Weekdays)
Western NY Superzone
Hudson River Superzone
New York City*
Long Island*  29
Nature of Demand and Price 
One final look at the data provides insight into the basic relationship between 
demand and price.  Since demand is fixed prior to the determination of LBMP, using 
SCUC and SCD for the DAM and RTM respectively, the plots of demand against 
price also reflect the nature of the electricity supply curves, the major topic of Chapter 
3. 
Plots of summer weekday afternoon load versus LBMP for each superzone and 
market are presented in Figures 2-14 – 2-17.  At low to moderate load levels, the price 
in each market and superzone remains reasonably stable and is usually less than 
$150/MWh.  As load increases, price begins to exhibit more variation and increase 
substantially as demand approaches maximum capacity.  These plots confirm the 
classical representation of a short-run electricity market supply curve as a hockey-stick 
(Neenan et al., 2002).  However, there are clearly other factors at work that strongly 
affect the price paid for electricity.  In the Hudson River superzone, demand of as little 
as 5,000 MW produced prices that ranged from below $50/MWh to nearly 
$500/MWh.  System conditions, such as the state of the bulk power system, generator 
outages, weather and other factors must be at play for the same level of demand to 
exhibit such dramatically different prices.  More is said about these factors in Chapter 
4.   30
 
Figure 2-14: Load vs. LBMP for Western NY Superzone 
Figure 2-15: Load vs. LBMP for Hudson River Superzone   31
 
Figure 2-16: Load vs. LBMP for New York City 
Figure 2-17: Load vs. LBMP for Long Island 32 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND PUBLIC GOOD NATURE OF 
ELECTRICITY 
 
The analysis undertaken for this thesis seeks to answer two fundamental 
questions concerning demand response.  First, how much economic demand response 
is sufficient to improve social welfare from its current state of flat-rate tariffs?  
Second, what price is required to elicit the necessary levels of demand response to 
maintain required system reserve margins?  In order to understand how to best answer 
these questions, economic theory must be used to develop a reasonable and coherent 
foundation upon which to base the subsequent analysis.  
Welfare Theory and its Application to Electricity Markets 
Economists often discuss the effects of policy changes on societal welfare 
when reviewing whether these changes should be undertaken.  Such an analysis 
involves estimating the amount of consumer and producer surplus that is changed 
upon implementing the policy (Houck, 1986).  If society is made better off under the 
new policy, than there is evidence to support its implementation.  If, however, society 
is made worse off once the policy goes into effect, one might seek alternative solutions 
to the problem.  Traditionally, this type of analysis is used at a macroeconomic level 
where changes in policy have far-reaching effects.  For example, foreign and domestic 
trade policies, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
Northeast Dairy Compact respectively, are often times discussed in terms of their 
affects on social welfare.  However, more recently this application of economic theory 
has been extrapolated to analyze the affects of demand response programs in retail 
electricity markets.  
Boisvert and Neenan (2003) show that there are implications for social welfare 
under a fixed rate tariff because consumers of electricity never see the actual market  
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price for this commodity, and are therefore never able to compare their value for 
electricity against the actual costs to produce it.  Resources are re-directed by 
consumers to electricity when they could be put to “better” use elsewhere, based on 
the relative price of different goods and services.  Such an inefficient allocation of 
resources results in a deadweight loss to society from a welfare standpoint.  By 
allowing retail customers who are currently on a flat-rate tariff to bid their curtailment 
capability into wholesale electricity markets, Boisvert and Neenan (2003) show that 
social welfare is improved provided the payment needed to bring forth the load 
reduction is less than the deadweight loss it offsets.
1   
In order to see how welfare is improved by participation in economic DR 
programs, it is first appropriate to see how society is made better off when customers 
are moved from a flat-rate tariff to a tariff where the customer sees the actual market 
supply costs.  By responding to these contemporaneous prices, social welfare that was 
lost due to the inefficiencies resulting from a flat-rate tariff is now regained.  It is a 
simple extrapolation of these results to economic demand response programs because 
customers’ offers to curtail are in direct response to the marginal price for electricity.   
Improvement in Social Welfare Through Electricity Tariff Change 
Following Boisvert and Neenan (2003), consumers on a fixed tariff, rate T, pay 
the load weighted average price for electricity over a certain period of time for all 
consumption, regardless of the time it is consumed, to the local load serving entity 
(LSE).  This allows producers (e.g. generators) to always receive the wholesale 
market-clearing price for electricity, which is paid by LSEs who over-collect when 
LBMP is below the tariff-rate T and under-collect when LBMP is above T.  To 
                                                 
1 Under a real-time pricing tariff rates, this reduction in the deadweight loss is achieved not through any 
payment, but when customers respond to contemporaneous prices.  Thus, the change in net social 
welfare is always positive in this case.  
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identify the welfare effects of demand response, two cases are considered in the 
following analysis.  Figure 3-1 facilitates the exposition. 
 
 
Case 1: Actual Price (RTP) 
Assume consumers of electricity on an RTP rate are perfectly able to adjust 
electricity demands according to an established demand schedule in response to 
wholesale prices. Producers of electricity are dispatched according to their aggregate 
supply curve to meet this forthcoming demand, where no discontinuities exist in the 
supply curve and all generating units are perfectly flexible.  Under such assumptions, 
the market clears at price of P1 and load Q1 (Figure 3-1).  
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Consumers would reap the benefits of not having to pay for their full value 
placed on electricity at lower loads, according to their demand schedule, but instead 
would pay for all load demanded in this time period at the market-clearing price.  
Thus, the total value to consumers for this electricity is the area under their demand 
curve up to the load demanded that exceeds the cost to acquire it. The difference 
between these two is defined as consumer surplus. 
Consumer Surplus: a + b 
Producers also reap benefits due to the last-price auction used in electricity 
markets.  Producers’ net costs to generate the electricity are equal to the area under 
their respective supply (offer) curves, while those who actually produce electricity are 
paid in excess of this at the market-clearing price.  The difference between the total 
cost and total revenue is defined to be producer surplus. 
Producer Surplus: i + j 
Because the LSE acts as the customer’s agent in procuring electricity, it 
physically bills the consumer at the market-clearing price and provides this to 
producers.  Since it is assumed that there are no transactions costs, the LSE nets out to 
a zero position, neither gaining nor losing money in the transaction. 
Net LSE Payments = (i + j + h + k) - (i + j + h + k) = 0 
In order to see how well society allocated its resources, we can add up the 
producer and consumer surplus and the net LSE payments to arrive at a total social 
welfare value. 
Social Welfare = (a + b) + (i + j) 
 
Case 2: Flat-Rate Tariff  
In this case, assume consumers of electricity face a flat-rate tariff that provides 
no incentive to alter consumption as wholesale market prices change.  This would  
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result in a disconnect between producers and consumers.  On the one hand, consumers 
pay the load-weighted average price of electricity, tariff rate T, to the LSE regardless 
of quantity and time period.  They consume the amount of electricity that corresponds 
with this single price, quantity Q0 in Figure 3-1. 
Consumer Surplus: a + b + g + h + i 
Producers, on the other hand, receive the market-clearing price for electricity 
based on the demand at the time, which are some times higher and other times lower 
than the tariff rate T.  In Figure 3-1, the wholesale market-clearing price, P0, is shown 
to be higher than tariff rate T.
 2  Generators will produce enough electricity to exactly 
meet demand, Q0, but will require a very high price to do so, P0. 
Producer Surplus: b + c + d + i + j  
The LSE, who must charge consumers to purchase the electricity from 
suppliers, will under-collect in this time period.  To cover the LSEs cost of under-
collecting, it must over-collect from consumers in other intervals. It will bill 
consumers for using an amount of electricity equal to Q0 at the flat-rate tariff T but 
must pay the generators for that same quantity at the market price of P0. 
Net LSE Payments: b + c + d + e + f + g + h + i 
Again, by adding up the entire consumer and producer surplus and reducing it 
by the LSE payments, it is possible to estimate social welfare under this type of tariff 
rate. 
Social Welfare: (a + b) + (i + j) – (e + f) 
Since it is assumed that the status quo is a flat-rate tariff and a customer will 
move to a situation where wholesale electricity prices are directly passed through, then 
the net social welfare implications of such a policy change would be: 
                                                 
2 For simplicity, this example only deals with the situation when the LSE under-collects.  A parallel 
argument can be constructed for the periods when the LSE over-collects (see Boisvert and Neenan, 
2003).   
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Change in Social Welfare: {(a + b) + (i + j)} - {(a + b) + (i + j) – (e + f) } = (e + f) 
There is a deadweight loss to society due to inefficiencies associated with a flat-rate 
tariff equal to (e + f). 
Society is clearly better off when customers are moved to a rate that exposes 
them to the actual supply cost, since the deadweight loss associated with the flat-rate 
tariff has been removed.  However, there is ample evidence to support that many who 
are transitioned to an RTP rate choose to hedge themselves away from the risk 
associated with such variable prices (see Goldman et al., 2004) because they are 
unwilling, unable, or unsure of how to respond to such prices.  Fortunately, economic 
demand response programs exist to help harness these customers demand 
responsiveness while maintaining the safety and security of a hedged rate.   
Welfare Implications of Economic Demand Response Programs 
Under demand response programs like DADRP, customers on a flat-rate tariffs 
can express the changing value for electricity by offering their curtailment capability 
into the market as a supply resource.  In other words, the load that a customer would 
have consumed is now offered back to the market for others to use, provided the price 
is right.  Since most utility contracts are “full-rights” contracts, where a customer has 
the right to consume any amount of electricity, it is logical to impart the ownership 
rights of the electricity to the end-use customer.  If they chose to resell it to the 
marketplace, then the revenues generated from its sale are rightfully theirs.
3   
The reduction in load forthcoming under the demand response program is 
identical to that which would occur if the customer saw the actual cost of the 
commodity.  However, unlike the tariff rate where the load reduction is undertaken 
                                                 
3 Ruff (2002) argues that such ownership rights may be dubious, but that a customer must first purchase 
the electricity from the LSE before it can turn around and sell it back to the wholesale market.  For this 
analysis, the financial implications of backing out the tariff rate from customer payments for selling 
demand response into wholesale markets are ignored.  
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because the value of consuming that additional load is not worth the added cost, the 
payment provided to the customer for curtailing is enough to offset the cost associated 
with forgoing consumption. For the load curtailment to be social welfare improving, 
the payment to the customer for curtailing must more than offset the deadweight loss 
associated with the flat-rate tariff. 
The simulations that follow use this theory to estimate how much economic 
demand response is sufficient to exactly offset the societal deadweight loss associated 
with electricity consumers paying a flat rate all the time. 
Public Good Nature of Electric Reliability 
Demand response can also play a role in helping system operators improve the 
reliability of the bulk power system by invoking load curtailments during periods of 
system stress.  The NYISO is required by the Northeast Power Coordinating Council 
(NPCC) to maintain a certain amount of excess generating capacity on the system in 
case of a catastrophic event, e.g. the loss of a large generating station or a major 
transmission line.  There are times, however, when load exceeds this threshold and the 
system becomes deficient of reserves.  When such instances occur, the NYISO is 
required to take corrective actions to procure sufficient operating reserves (NYISO, 
2004a).  First, it asks many of the on-line generators to move to emergency operating 
limits.  These limits usually approach the unit’s maximum output, but can shorten the 
unit’s life due to wear-and-tear associated with operating at such high levels.  Second, 
the NYISO can purchase emergency power from neighboring control areas so that 
native generation can be backed down to provide the needed reserves.  If neither of 
these two steps is anticipated to provide the NYISO with the required reserve margins, 
it can, in part, rely on consumers to cut back electricity consumption to avoid 
blackouts.  
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Public appeals to conserve electricity during times of system stress are at best 
only partially effective because of the public good nature of reliability.  The reliable 
operation of the bulk power system is part of the charter of each system operator.  
System-wide consumers on electricity enjoy the benefits of this reliability.  However, 
in the event of a system contingency where reserves run short, customers could reduce 
the likelihood of an outage by curtailing load.  If enough customers curtail, thereby 
meeting the necessary reserve requirement, a complete outage for some is avoided 
while others have simply removed the specter of a blackout.   
Boisvert and Neenan (2003) theorize how firms will curtail electricity when 
reserves are viewed as a public good. They show that the profit maximizing input use 
exists where the marginal value product of electricity is equal to the combined 
marginal value of reserves to all firms.  However, it is unlikely that each firm will 
incorporate the benefits of additional reliability provided by its neighbors, and will 
therefore curtail less than is socially optimal.  In this case, the increased reliability is 
consumed without being paid for, resulting in a free-rider problem. 
Tthe NYISO created the Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP) and 
Installed Capacity Special Case Resource (ICAP/SCR) program, which allow 
customers to receive benefits that approach the full social value of reliability.  Upon 
the declaration of a forecasted reserve shortage where the other actions available to the 
NYISO are believed to be insufficient to return the system to a more stable state, 
ICAP/SCR resources are dispatched.  However, if the whole of these resources are 
insufficient to achieve the necessary level of reserves, EDRP participants are called 
upon to curtail electricity.  In contrast to ICAP/SCR where dispatch is executed based 
on an aggregate supply curve derived from submitted strike prices, EDRP is 
dispatched in a more command-and-control method where an entire zones resources 
are called upon to perform.  Up until the summer of 2003, the joint EDRP and  
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ICAP/SCR resource pool were dispatched to meet forecasted reserve margins, but 
have often times been in excess of what the system needed to maintain operating 
reserve margins (see Neenan et al. 2003).  Since the payments provided to these 
resources are distributed across all load serving entities in the market as a tax, money 
is being paid out for resources that were not needed. 
An alternative to paying customers to curtail a sufficient amount of electricity 
to maintain adequate reserve margins is to create an electricity rate whereby customers 
pay the marginal social value of reliability for their electricity.   Critical Peak Pricing 
(CPP) tariff rates have become en vogue over the past several years because they 
induce reductions in demand during only a limited number of hours each year when 
such curtailments are required to ensure reliable operation of the grid (Charles River 
Associates, 2004).  They are in stark contrast to interruptible rates, which provided 
deep discounts in return for the right of a utility to disconnect the customer entirely 
from the system.  Under CPP rates, the customer can make the decision to buy-
through or curtail, instead of having such actions forced upon it.  The optimal price 
that brings about the necessary reduction in demand, however, varies with each 
circumstance. 
The second set of simulations below identifies the optimal price required to 
always maintain reserve margins through the use of targeted load reductions under the 
EDRP program or under a CPP tariff rate.   41 
CHAPTER 4 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
The review of the data in Chapter 2 provided a sense of the relationship 
between load and price, while Chapter 3 presented the theoretical underpinnings for 
the analysis to be performed later. In this chapter, the econometric supply models to be 
used later in the simulations are developed and the results of these estimated models 
are provided.   
Empirical Specification of the Short-Run Electricity Market Supply Models 
In order to derive the change in price due to demand response, it is first 
necessary to create a representation of the short-run supply curve for electricity.  The 
figures in the Chapter 2 displayed the basic relationship between load and price: a 
hockey stick.  Relatively small increases in price are observed for large increases in 
quantity at low levels of capacity but then rise steeply as quantity approaches 
maximum capacity levels (Stoft, 2002). 
The Nature of the Supply for Electricity 
The lowest cost generators, traditionally called base units, have high capital 
costs associated with building the plant but the variable cost of producing electricity is 
very low.  Nuclear units and large hydro-electric projects, such as the Niagara Falls 
generating station, are perfect examples of these types of generators. Many are 
classified as “must-run” units, in the sense that shutting them down can cause serious 
problems for the unit and can reduce the flexibility of system operators.  Nuclear 
reactors, in particular, have long shutdown periods; they require several days to fully 
re-energize and reconnect to the grid.  After the base unit capacity is exhausted, mid-
merit units are turned on to meet load.  This part of the bid stack is comprised of units 
with lower capital costs but ones whose variable costs of electricity production are   42
somewhat higher than base units.  They are called upon during the peak hours of the 
day to serve even moderate levels of load, but they are not generally needed in the 
overnight hours when demand is low.  In contrast, peaking units, the units with the 
highest marginal costs to produce electricity generate electricity infrequently but are 
nonetheless needed to ensure supply instantaneously meets demand, particularly at 
times when demand approaches system capacity.  Given the frequency with which 
peakers are asked to generate, they must cover their capital and other fixed costs 
through a combination of the energy and capacity market.
1  If capacity market 
revenues are insufficient, then higher and higher energy bids must be submitted to 
ensure profitability.  Due to the limited number and relatively small capacity 
associated with these types of plants, the supply curve becomes very steep as system 
load approaches maximum capacity. 
The Process of Price Formation 
Traditionally, it is assumed that the market-clearing price for a good or service 
is simultaneously formed when consumers and producers meet.  They each have a 
well-established and known schedule that lays out the price and quantity they would 
demand (supply).  The point, at which the value to consumers of having another unit 
of the product is equal to the value to producers of creating another unit, will clear the 
market.  These types of markets are seen as price dependent, since it is price that 
dictates the quantities consumed and produced.    
Electricity at the wholesale level is very different, in that the demand for 
electricity is truly exogenous to the system.  Since the vast majority of consumers are 
on a flat-rate tariff, which insulates them from any volatility inherent in markets such 
as these, the demand for electricity is not dependent upon the wholesale price for 
                                                 
1 In the northeastern ISOs, LSEs are required to procure sufficient capacity to cover their forecasted 
maximum demand plus a margin within a month, a 6-month period, or longer.  Generators can sell this 
capacity to LSEs, either through bilateral contracts or in one of the many auctions run by the ISO.   43
electricity.  Rather, consumers use what they need up the point where the value from 
consuming another unit of electricity is not worth its flat-rate cost.  In the short-run, 
this causes demand to be perfectly inelastic to fluctuations in wholesale prices since so 
few customers ever actually see these prices.  Therefore, the point at which the fixed 
demand intersects the submitted offer (i.e. supply) curve results in the market-clearing 
price of electricity.  This has implications for accurately representing and estimating 
short-term electricity market supply functions.   
Initial Model Specification 
Any statistical representation of the electricity supply curve must be price-
dependent and able to reflect the curvature observed in the marketplace.  There are 
very few functional forms able to capture this stylized curvature.  So much so, that 
only a handful of researchers have published their efforts in this area over the past 
several years.   
Borenstein (2004) utilizes a method that assumes a structure for the 
marketplace as a whole and then iteratively derives the long-run profit-maximizing 
mix of generation assets to meet maximum demand.  Instead of using actual market 
price data to represent the market, Borenstein assumes the supply curve is better 
represented by long-run operating cost data of three different types of generators: 
Base-load, mid-merit, and peakers. By varying the mix of generation assets in the 
market, Borenstein is able to reasonably represent the aggregate offer (i.e. supply) 
curve one would expect if all suppliers were to bid their marginal cost.  However, such 
an approach is entirely predicated upon the assumed cost structure of these units, in 
that suppliers will strictly and exactly bid in these costs, and does not incorporate any 
other factors, like market or system conditions, that might alter the underlying supply 
curve.  The analysis may help to explain at what point a new generator of certain type 
should be added to the system, but is unable to help predict the impact on hourly   44
prices when load is reduced, the goal of this research.  Even if such an analysis could 
provide the change in price, it would require solving the model thousands of times 
under different sets of circumstances.  Such sensitivity analysis would be both time-
consuming and costly to undertake on the scale required for this type of work. 
As an alternative to using unobservable cost data, it would be advantageous to 
find a method that utilizes actual observable data. Griffin (1977) and later Preckel and 
Hertel (1988) develop methods for using the solutions from a linear program to 
estimate a summary cost function.  Griffin shows that by varying the input prices for 
the LP model over a set of predetermined factors, the production surface can be 
mapped out over a wide range of both observed and expected conditions.  Once this 
set of points on the production surface is known, an indirect cost function can be 
estimated from the pseudo-data.  One problem with such an approach is that the 
perturbations in input prices may cause a basis change, resulting in large consequences 
for the estimated indirect cost function. Preckel and Hertel proposed a correction for 
this shortcoming by developing a method for summarizing LP models, which does not 
pre-specify the sample design.  Instead, they show how an algorithm can be used to 
minimize local approximations to the underlying process model over a wide range of 
values in order to generate the solution used for the estimated equations. 
The acceptance of their work as legitimate methods for using the output of an 
LP as a means for estimating cost equations would allow for the use of statistical 
methods to estimate short-run supply curves using actual market data. Fortunately, this 
is exactly the process of price formation in the DAM and RTM.  The NYISO’s day-
ahead unit commitment algorithm (SCUC) and the real-time dispatch (SCD) 
programming models produce an optimal minimum cost solution to meet the specified 
level of demand.  The resulting market-clearing prices map out a production surface 
for generating electricity at the wholesale level as demand bids are altered.  This   45
supply relationship can then be estimated as a price dependent function where demand 
is assumed exogenous to the system. 
Neenan et al. (2002) use this logic to extend the work by Griffin, Preckel and 
Hertel by estimating a price-dependent short-run supply function from observed 
market-clearing price and quantity data.  They chose a logarithmic spline function to 
better track the sharp increases in the slope of the supply curve at the extremes of the 
data.  With splines, the curve is assumed to be structurally different at different levels 
of load, as if the market entered an entirely different price regime.  The curve is 
further allowed to change slope even within a regime since the model includes 
additional explanatory variables that influence the slope of the curve.  However, 
understanding where the regimes change is subjective and can therefore affect the 
analysis significantly if the points are not chosen correctly.  It also suffers from a 
difficulty in accurately estimating areas under the curve, as required in the subsequent 
welfare analysis, since the function is not differentiable at all points.   
These last two issues are resolved by Oh (2003) who econometrically estimates 
a price dependent supply curve where the inverse price is a function of the current load 
as a proportion of its maximum value.  Such a relationship allows one to capture the 
“hockey-stick” nature of electricity market supply curves in the area it is most 
expected to arise, close to system capacity, while remaining globally continuous and 
differentiable.  
To facilitate the simulation of the market and estimate the welfare gains from 
DR, the functional form developed by Oh (2003) is employed herein.  This function 
has the further advantage of avoiding the specification of the knots for the spline 
function, simplifying any necessary correction for serial correlation and econometric 
estimation.  Specifically, the functional form of the inverse supply equation is:   46
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where 
  Pm,z,t     = Price in market m, zone z and time t 
  Qm,z,t     = Quantity demanded in market m, zone z and time t 
Max(Qm,z)      = Maximum quantity demanded in market m and zone z over a 
specified number of intervals of time t 
However, quantity is not the only variable that can affect price.  Clearly, there are 
other factors at work in the marketplace that help to shift the supply curve either up or 
down, or even alter the slope.  If such factors are included in the supply model as both 
intercept shifters and slope shifters, then the supply equation becomes: 
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where  
 D m z,t,j    = Shifter variable j in market m, zone z and time t.   
By appending an appropriate error structure (i.e. mean zero and constant variance), 
this equation can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) by taking its 
inverse, in which it becomes a linear equation that is a function of the inverse of the 
price data series. 
Based on equation (2), it is possible to understand how price is affected by 
demand changes. The partial derivative of equation (2) with respect to demand is:   47
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If we assume all the estimated coefficients are positive, than a one-unit increase in the 
amount of load demanded would increase the price by the part of the supply model 
that is directly a function of load multiplied by the inverse price function squared.  In 
all cases, this will be positive.  However, as the quantity demanded approaches the 
maximum observed, the denominator of this fraction gets smaller, which causes the 
partial derivative to get larger.  So small changes in load at this point on the supply 
curve can cause price to increase dramatically. 
It is also important to understand the effect proportional changes in load will 
have price.  The price flexibility, defined as the percentage change in price for a 1% 
change in load, can be derived from equation (2) as: 
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Assuming the parameter estimates are all positive, a one percent change in the load 
will induce a positive percentage change in the price, which gets larger as load 
approaches its maximum.   48
If instead a slope shifter variable were to change, taking the partial derivative 
of equation (2) with respect to the slope shifter would indicate how the price would 
change: 
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Again, if the estimated parameters are all assumed to be positive, than both the 
numerator and the denominator will be always positive.  However, if the coefficients 
on a shifter variable in equation (2) are negative, than the change in price due to a one-
unit change in the shifter variable will be negative.  As load approaches its maximum, 
the numerator will approach the sum of the two coefficients on the shifters from 
below.  Alternatively, as load moves further away from its maximum, the numerator 
will approach the intercept shifter’s parameter estimate from above.      
Since one of the goals of this analysis is to develop supply models to be used 
in assessing the change in price due to a change in load, how a change in a shifter 
variable would affect the supply flexibility is also of interest.  Taking the first 
derivative of equation (4) with respect to one of the slope shifter variables indicates 
the effect a unit change in the shifter has on the supply flexibility.  
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In the case of a positive shifter variable coefficient, increases in the shifter variable 
produce a negative change in the supply flexibility.  In the other case, the coefficient 
on the shifter variable is negative, the supply flexibility increases for a unit increase in 
the shifter. 
Model Correction for Serial Correlation and ARCH Effect 
The data used for this analysis are comprised of 8 hourly observations in the 
“peak” period of each weekday pooled together across the summer of 2001 (see 
Chapter 2 for details).  In order to apply OLS to estimate this model, the covariance 
between any two different residuals in the time series must be zero.  If, instead, the 
residuals have some correlation over time (i.e. serial correlation), than the model must 
be corrected to ensure the estimated parameters have the minimum variance possible 
(i.e. efficient estimators) (Gujarati, 1995).  Many empirical time-series econometric 
models assume a one period autoregressive structure in the error generating process 
(i.e. AR(1)) to remove the observed serial correlation.  However, due to the way these 
electricity markets work, a much longer AR process is hypothesized.  In the case of 
the Day-Ahead Market, the unit commitment algorithm looks at the entire 24 hours of 
the day to minimize the overall daily production cost of electricity.  Thus, to 
characterize the “memory” of the error process in this market, it is hypothesized that 
one must look out 16 periods, or 2 days in the 8-hour days analyzed herein.  Given the   50
more short-term dispatch that occurs in real-time, only an 8-period AR process is 
included in the real-time market supply flexibility model.  A review of the data shows 
that an AR process as defined is warranted.  
An additional problem that is expected with time series financial data, such as 
this, is volatility clustering.  The volatility in the price series is not random, as 
classical econometric theory requires, but rather follows some sort of longer-term 
pattern (Gujarati, 1995).  A quick review of the data used for this analysis shows that 
such an assumption is valid.  To correct for this problem, an autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedastic (ARCH) correction must be further applied to the error structure of the 
supply models. 
To account for the serial correlation and volatility clustering in the data, the 
model and its associated error structure are decomposed into: 
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This system of equations is estimated using maximum likelihood (ML) methods due to 
the presence of serial correlation. 
Simultaneity Correction in Real-Time Market Supply Model   
Econometric theory requires that the regressors in a model be exogenous, or 
independent of each other and not defined by other regressors.  If such is not the case, 
the explanatory variable in question will adversely affect the residuals in the model   51
resulting in biased and inconsistent estimators (Gujarati, 1995).  To correct for this 
problem, a separate regression must be run for the explanatory variable in question 
and then use the predicted value from this model instead of the original explanatory 
variable. This is the method of instrumental variable. 
It is hypothesized that the real-time load is highly correlated with the real-time 
supply equation’s residuals, so an instrumental variable approach is required.  This 
variable is estimated separately and then the predicted value of real-time load will be 
included in the real-time supply equation as an instrumental variable.  Real-time load 
is most likely a function of weather, with some adjustments for cyclical consumption 
throughout the day.  Often times, forecasting models of this type use past values of 
load to predict current levels of load (Ramanthan et. al., 1997).  However, given the 8-
hour day that has been constructed, such an approach is ill-advised.  Instead, a simple 
quadratic functional form is used.  The time-series nature of the data also necessitates 
correcting for serial correlation that is anticipated to exist in the real-time load data.  
The function to be estimated is therefore: 
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where 
Pm,z,t     = Price in market m, zone z and time t 
  ,,
RTM
mzt Q     = Quantity demanded in market m, zone z and time t 
Cm,z,t,j               = Cyclical variable j in market m, zone z, time t 
  νm,z,t     = Disturbance ~  ( )
2
,, 0, mzt N σ  
  εm,z,t     = IID(0,1).   52
Final Empirical Specification of the Supply Models 
Both the NYISO’s Day-Ahead Market and Real-Time Market short-run supply 
curves are to be estimated.  Since these markets are run at different times, have 
different time horizons for which the dispatch is good for, and use different data 
inputs, they must be estimated separately.  However, the results of the DAM serve as 
the basis for the RTM dispatch and as such must be integrated into the estimated real-
time supply model.   
The final form of the DAM supply model to be estimated is: 
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While the final form of the RTM supply model to be estimated is: 
(17)  
()
,, ,,
,,
, , ,, , , , , ,, , ,
11 ,
1
ˆ
1
ˆ
RTM
mzt mzt
RTM kk
mzt RTM RTM
mz mzj mzt j mz mzj mztj RTM
jj mz
P
Q
DD
Max Q
υ
αη βφ
==
=+
   ++ + −    
∑∑
 
(18) 
16
,, ,, ,, ,,
1
mzt mzt mzk mzt k
k
υε φ υ −
=
=− ∑  
(19)  ,, ,, ,, mzt mzt mzt he ε = where em,z,t ~N(0,1)   
(20)  
2
,, ,, 1 ,, 1 ,, 1 ,, 1 mzt mz mzt mz mzt hh ϖχ ε γ − − =+ +  where hm,z,t ~  ( )
2
, 0, mz N σ    53
The shifters that will be included in the DAM and RTM supply curves are based on 
those factors that are assumed to alter the shape the supply curve and will be discussed 
below. 
Additional Factors Affecting the Supply Functions 
For this analysis a host of additional data are to be included as conditioning 
variables in the supply models.  For purposes of this evaluation, it is assumed that only 
three variables can affect the Day-Ahead Market aside from load: temperature and 
reduced generation and transmission capacity.  Due to the increased complexity of the 
NYISO’s spot market and its dependence on the results of the DAM, there are 
substantially more variables included in the Real-Time Market supply model: weather, 
transmission capacity and constraints, DAM forecast error, the proportion of RTM 
load covered through DAM purchases, and whether or not an EDRP event was 
declared.   
Weather plays an integral role in electricity markets, especially summer 
peaking systems like New York.  Increased air conditioning and other process cooling 
loads help to substantially increase demand for power on hot days.  If high 
temperatures persist over a series of days, the abundance of steel and asphalt in major 
cities like New York can absorb the heat day after day with little opportunity to shed it 
(Energy Use, 2000).  As the heat wave progresses, buildings and roads act like 
radiators, thereby increasing the ambient temperature even further.  Hotter buildings 
require more air conditioning to cool, causing a cycle that is only broken once the heat 
relents.  High relative humidity levels further confound the situation, limiting the 
degree of radiational cooling that normally takes place at night. Higher temperatures 
and humidity levels also infringe upon generation capacity, as their turbines run hotter 
and therefore are unable to produce as much electricity as under more suitable 
conditions (NYISO, 2004b) Clearly, the current day’s temperature and humidity   54
should affect the slope of the supply curve, but one would also expect that the 
previous day’s weather should also have an affect, albeit a smaller one.   
A temperature heat index (THI) was constructed from hourly temperature and 
humidity data according to a commonly used formula derived by the National Weather 
Service (Rothfusz, 1990). In addition, the previous day’s maximum hourly THI was 
included to control for the lingering affects of high temperatures.  Even though 
generators are adversely affected by hot weather, there are other mitigating 
circumstances that could cause their output to be further reduced.  Such conditions 
should be included in this model as well. 
Generators in New York State pledged 36,132 MW of installed capacity 
(ICAP) to the NYISO electricity market during the summer of 2001 (NYISO 
Homepage, 2004).  By selling capacity in the NYISO’s ICAP market, generators 
accept the responsibility to bid all of that capacity into the Day-Ahead Market, or 
inform the NYISO of why the entire amount cannot be submitted.  Reasons such as 
forced or planned outages may preclude an ICAP provider from fulfilling its bidding 
obligation in all hours, but as long as the NYISO is notified of the situation, the 
supplier is deemed to be in compliance. In the summer of 2001, an average of 90% of 
the pledged ICAP was bid into the DAM.  Given that the NYISO plans and procures 
for a reserve margin on forecasted peak demand of 18%, the average actual reserve 
margin in the DAM, based on ICAP providers’ supply bids, was only 6%.  This lack 
of excess capacity, depending upon where it was located in relation to constrained 
areas of the bulk power system, could have a tremendous effect on price.  For this 
reason, a measure of the proportion of ICAP offered into the market is included in the 
model. 
The infrastructure for transmitting the electricity to where it needs to go can 
also cause prices to change dramatically.  A de-rated or out-of-service transmission   55
line has the potential for a cascading effect on price miles from the location of the line 
or interface, due to the congestion it places on the system.  If cheaper electricity is 
unable to move across the system, the NYISO must utilize more costly supply to meet 
demand in these locations.  If the system in this “higher priced” area is uncongested, 
all consumers must pay for the more expensive supply.  Alternatively, if this area is 
congested, its entirely possible that loads further downstream could pay even more 
than they otherwise would have.
2  In general,the effects on the system diminish for 
loads situated further and further away from the affected line or interface.   
Transmission congestion is identified in this analysis as being slightly separate 
from transmission outages.  Although a transmission outage is a sufficient condition to 
generate congestion, it is not a necessary one.  In this analysis, it is assumed that 
congestion and outages on the infrastructure have potentially different effects on the 
shape of the supply curve and are therefore modeled as two separate variables.  
However, the relevant data are reported for identical facilities on the bulk power grid, 
and therefore allow for some similarities in constructing the variables to be used.   
To simplify, only a small set of transmission lines were identified for this 
analysis.  Each line had a set of factors assigned to it in order to assess its effect on 
prices for zones that took electricity off of the grid further downstream.  For example, 
the Center East transmission constraint would have a high factor assigned to it when 
looking at its effect on Hudson Valley superzone prices, but would have a much 
smaller affect for Long Island and New York.   Congestion was defined as the number 
of minutes in an hour that the transmission facility was at its capacity limit.  The 
                                                 
2 Generally, electricity runs from west to east and north to south in New York’s bulk power system.  
The Center East transmission interface is the main passage for cheap electricity generated in the Central 
and Western part of the State to move to the more populated areas of the Capital district and points 
south.  Since there are relatively no transmission constraints west of Center East and there are a series 
of transmission interfaces as one moves down the Hudson River Valley that can limit the flow of 
electricity to the major electricity sink (New York City), load that is “downstream” of a transmission 
constraint is hereafter considered to be further south from the bottleneck.   56
transmission outage variable, on the other hand, was constructed by taking the amount 
of maximum observed capacity for each transmission facility that was unavailable to 
the market.  Outage information may change over the course of the day, so what may 
have been used in SCUC is not necessarily identical to what was incorporated into 
SCD.  Thus, two variables were created for transmission outages – one for each 
market.  Since congestion in the Day-Ahead Market is a mathematical construction of 
the constraint matrix input into SCUC, transmission congestion was only used in the 
spot market supply curve. 
As mentioned previously, there is a distinct link between the two electricity 
markets run by the NYISO – the results of the DAM are used as the basis for finding 
the optimal solution to the spot market dispatch algorithm.  A comparison of the DAM 
and RTM LBMPs in the summer of 2001 showed that prices were often similar, but 
diverged substantially as real-time circumstances drifted away from those used by 
SCUC.  The “pricing” pass in SCUC schedules generators to meet the load bid into the 
market by LSEs.  Since the DAM is a forward market, the LSEs can effectively use 
this market to hedge against the increased volatility in the NYISO’s spot market   The 
closer an LSE’s bid is to its real-time energy needs, the less likely the NYISO is to 
require some amount of re-dispatch in real-time to meet load.  Thus, the proportion of 
real-time load that is covered through DAM purchases would be expected to have 
some effect on the real-time supply curve. 
This affect is mitigated slightly by the “reliability” pass that occurs as one of 
the final steps in SCUC.  This pass allows for additional generation to be scheduled to 
generate electricity for the following day when bid load is insufficient to cover 
forecasted load.  The NYISO wants to ensure ample generation is lined up to meet 
expected demand, even if this generation is not needed to meet bid load in the DAM.  
If the NYISO properly forecasts load and the state of the grid doesn’t deviate   57
substantially from what was assumed by SCUC, SCD should arrive at a similar 
optimal market solution.  However, if the NYISO over-commits resources in the 
DAM, generators expected to be needed in Real-Time are backed down as the load 
they were supposed to serve never materializes.  Such a situation would be expected to 
affect the supply curve.  Alternatively, the NYISO could under-commit resources, 
forcing SCD to make dispatch decisions with a much shorter time horizon, resulting in 
a much different but measurable effect on the supply curve. 
In the event generation is expected to possibly run short of meeting demand, 
the NYISO implements a series of steps to ensure reliable operation of the grid.  In 
many cases, the NYISO is able to quickly rectify the problem with relatively simple 
solutions, but there are times when reserves fall so low that reductions in load are the 
only way to save the system from partial or complete collapse.  The NYISO developed 
the Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP) as one of the final steps to deal 
with forecasted severe reserve shortfalls.  When events are declared by the NYISO, 
program participants voluntarily reduce consumption during the specified hours in 
exchange for a minimum $500/MWh payment.  This reduction in load can have a 
significant affect on price, and would therefore be expected to alter the shape of the 
supply curve as generators react.  During the summer of 2001, there were four events 
issued by the NYISO, all of which occurred during the same week in August.
3  A 
single dummy variable for EDRP event days was constructed and included in the 
RTM supply curve, since market participants are not notified of an event until after 
DAM schedules are posted. 
For ease of future reference, these explanatory variables and the models in 
which each is used are listed in Table 4-1. 
                                                 
3 EDRP events were declared in all NYISO pricing zones on August 7
th, 8
th, and 9
th predominantly 
during the afternoon hours.  On August 10
th, the event was limited to the zones east of the Center East 
transmission interface (zones F – K).     58
 
 
Variable Description
DAM 
Supply 
Model
RTM Load 
Forecasting 
Model
RTM 
Supply 
Model
THI Temperature Heat Index X X X
THI Squared THI Squared X
Max. Yesterday THI
Maximum of the previous day's 
THI
X
Wgt. Trans. Outages
Reduction in capacity for 
transmission lines and 
interfaces affecting a zone 
weighted by location
XX
Offered Gen / UCAP
Generation Offers into the 
DAM as a proportion of UCAP
X
Wgt. Constraint Mins.
Minutes transmission interfaces 
affecting a zone was 
constrained weighted by 
location
X
Positive Forecast Error
Amount of real-time load in 
excess of day-ahead forecast 
load
X
Negative Forecast Error
Amount of real-time load that is 
less than day-ahead forecast 
load
X
DAM Coverage of RTM
Amount of real-time load that 
was purchased in the DAM
X
EDRP Event Day
Dummy variable representing 
days when EDRP was called
X
Table 4-1: Explanatory Variables Used in Econometric Models   59
DAM Supply Model 
Supply Parameter Estimates  
Overall, the Day-Ahead Market supply models fit the data incredibly well. 
According to Table 4-2, the models explained 87% of the variation in the data or 
more, with the highest R-Squared appearing in the Western NY superzone.  Not 
surprisingly, the models were unable to pick up all the variation in LBMPs.
4  Most of 
the zones had very distinct daily and weekly pricing cycles, as evidenced by the 
statistically significant sine/cosine variables and  day of the week variables 
respectively. 
Because the main requirement for these models is to provide accurate estimates 
of the slope of the supply curve for further policy analysis, it is critical that the 
parameter estimates be large relative to their standard errors (e.g. high t-ratios) in 
order to lead to precise supply flexibility estimates.  The high t-ratios on almost all of 
the shifter variables in all four models is an indication that the contributing effects of 
each to price have been captured.   
The positive coefficient in all models on offered generation as a proportion of 
ICAP indicates as more generation is brought on line, the supply flexibility is reduced.  
This is as expected since increased competition on the supply side of the market 
should cause all market participants to reduce their bids closer to marginal cost. 
                                                 
4 SCUC is a non-linear programming model that finds the minimum cost solution of meeting the next 
days load requirements for each hour while maintaining a safe and secure transmission system.  Given 
the complexity inherent in such a computer program, it is amazing that these models were able to 
explain as much of the variation as they did.   60
 
 
It seems reasonable to believe that cheaper electricity cannot be transported to 
where it is needed if the amount of transmission capacity is sufficiently reduced, 
implying that more expensive generation will be required to meet load.  Transmission 
outages should, ceteris paribus, increase the supply flexibility.  However, the Hudson 
River superzone and New York City zone both have negative estimated parameters for 
this variable, as evidenced by the negative t-statistic, indicating less transmission 
capacity actually causes the supply flexibility to be reduced.  This counterintuitive 
result could come about if generators who would have been at the margin find 
themselves further down the bid stack, as other, more expensive, units are now the 
ones setting price.  One bidding strategy could be for these units to reduce their bids to 
be more in line with marginal cost in order to guarantee getting scheduled and receive 
the higher LBMP.  In areas of tight capacity and significant market monitoring by the 
NYISO, as is the case down the Hudson River and on into the City, such bidding 
strategies are reasonable. 
Table 4-2: Estimated Supply Models for NYISO DAM 
R-Squared
Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic
Intercept 0.0165 5.23 0.0039 4.27 0.0044 5.70 0.0024 2.37
Intercept Shifters
Daily Sine Curve -0.0004 -1.99 0.0002 0.81 0.0000 0.06 -0.0006 -1.76
Daily Cosine Curve -0.0003 -1.55 -0.0001 -0.71 -0.0006 -4.26 -0.0011 -2.94
Tuesday -0.0001 -0.34 0.0003 0.94 -0.0007 -2.23 0.0006 1.31
Wednesday -0.0003 -1.12 0.0008 2.82 -0.0001 -0.33 0.0016 3.36
Thursday 0.0001 0.31 0.0006 2.52 -0.0006 -1.86 -0.0003 -0.61
Friday 0.0003 1.35 0.0015 9.94 -0.0006 -1.86 0.0017 4.71
Holiday 0.0045 0.93 0.0028 4.86 -0.0022 -2.34 -0.0032 -1.89
DAM Bid Load 0.0126 0.40 -0.0430 -1.98 -0.1318 -4.34 -0.0559 -1.47
Slope Shifters
Wgt. Trans. Outages 0.0000 -1.25 0.0000 3.21 0.0000 3.58 0.0000 -0.80
Temp. Heat Index (THI) -0.0003 -3.44 0.0001 1.89 0.0001 1.92 0.0003 2.71
Offered Gen / UCAP 0.0672 1.92 0.0835 3.60 0.1729 5.48 0.0880 2.22
See Equation (13)
0.964 0.957 0.905 0.873
Western NY Hudson River New York City Long Island  61
In three of the four zones (i.e. Hudson River, NYC, and Long Island), the 
models indicate that higher temperatures actually help to reduce the supply flexibility.  
This result also seems to defy expectations, since one would expect higher 
temperatures to correspond with higher loads and therefore higher prices.  However, a 
similar argument to the one previously made for reduced transmission capacity works 
here as well.  With more generation being scheduled, its possible that generators at the 
bottom of the bid stack would be more inclined to let the high priced units compete 
while they set their offers closer to marginal cost. 
Supply Price Flexibility Estimates   
By including interactions terms in the estimated supply models, the supply 
price flexibilities are able to vary substantially over all levels of load and even for the 
same quantity of electricity demanded.  Table 4-3 shows that the range in estimated 
price flexibilities are rather consistent across the four zones: providing a minimum that 
is less than one while maxing out at a value in excess of 30.  The average estimated 
flexibility increases by roughly 10 to 15% as one progresses across the grid from west 
to east and north to south, ending with the highest average price flexibility in New 
York City and Long Island – the areas of the state with the most price variability and 
highest average prices.  In these two zones, a one percent reduction in demand would 
cause an average price reduction of over 3%.   
The distribution of these price flexibilities is also interesting for it reveals what 
is driving the aforementioned results.  In the Western part of the state, there are only 
42 hours when the supply price flexibility was greater than 4.  However, down in the 
City, there were almost twice as many hours when the price flexibility fell into this 
range.  On Long Island, it was close to three times as many.  Demand response in 
these two areas clearly has a role to play in reducing market prices.    
   62
 
 
 
The effects of the shifter variables are even more pronounced when the 
estimated supply curves are displayed in graphical form.  Figures 4-1 – 4-4 illustrate 
representative supply curves at the global minimum, average, and maximum values of 
the shifter variables.  As the figures show, the minimum and average supply curves are 
not dramatically different fro each other.  However, at the maximum values of the 
shifter variables, the supply curve rises rapidly at very modest load levels.  It is these 
periods when demand response can play a key role in helping the system maintain 
reserve margins while improving market efficiency and social welfare. 
Table 4-3: Estimated Supply Price Flexibilities for NYISO DAM 
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Less than 0
Between 0 and 1
Between 1 and 2
Between 2 and 4
Between 4 and 8
Between 8 and 16
Between 16 and 32
Greater than 32
Western NY Hudson River New York City Long Island
2.45
30.79
2.82
0.65 0.86 0.97 0.95
3.46
38.49
0
22
0
3
51.80
3.13
40.76
272
186
31
5
6
0
0
12
263
184
51
12
3
3
175
267
60
17
4
2
0
2
177
232
83
26
5
3  63
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RTM Supply Model 
Recall from earlier in this chapter that the real-time load is assumed to be 
correlated with the error structure of the RTM supply curve.  Thus, an instrumental 
variable approach is used whereby the real-time load is forecasted using weather, daily 
and weekly cycle variables. 
Load Forecasting Parameter Estimates  
The large variation in observed real-time load over the course of the summer of 
2001 can be explained surprisingly well using such a simple functional form (Table 4-
4).  All four models are able to explain over 95% of the variability in the data.   
 Temperature is a strong predictor for load, as evidenced by the large t-
statistics on at least one of the THI variables.  It is surprising that both the level and 
squared terms are never both significant at the 10% level, but given that at least one is 
in every model is comforting.  There is evidence that load differs by day of the week, 
but not in identical ways across the different zones.  The same is true for the daily 
cycle variables.  They too differ by zone.   
 
Table 4-4: Estimated Load Forecasting Models for NYISO RTM 
R-Squared
Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic
Intercept 5608.9812 6.41 708.8437 0.82 3298.1457 2.63 1142.1818 4.11
Daily Sine Curve -121.1391 -12.82 21.2345 1.69 -10.3689 -0.60 -4.1218 -0.89
Daily Cosine Curve 11.7368 1.22 49.2380 3.80 180.9801 10.98 49.4381 11.22
Tuesday -40.5837 -1.40 -50.9195 -1.84 62.6802 1.11 27.3173 1.84
Wednesday -120.4075 -3.10 -97.7351 -2.60 -7.4367 -0.10 9.0016 0.45
Thursday -186.9245 -4.82 -179.7084 -4.97 -201.7098 -2.71 -51.0323 -2.59
Friday -234.3328 -8.07 -202.3430 -7.38 -368.4463 -6.55 -89.5370 -6.00
Holiday -782.0606 -10.11 -782.0606 -10.11 -1315.9584 -8.24 -346.5446 -8.20
Temp. Heat Index (THI) 2.4818 0.11 57.1373 2.53 89.0273 2.84 16.7931 2.44
THI Squared. 0.2974 2.00 -0.1106 -0.76 -0.3339 -1.74 -0.0529 -1.25
See Equation (11)
Western NY Hudson River New York City Long Island
0.972 0.974 0.958 0.958  66
Supply Parameter Estimates  
In the Real-Time market, the computer algorithm SCD is required to solve for 
the optimal, minimum cost dispatch every 5-minutes.  In fact, some units receive 
basepoints, or dispatch instructions, every 6-seconds.  The level of complexity 
required to instantaneously meet supply and demand while not violating any of the 
hundreds of constraints for reliability, both at the local level and at the bulk power 
system level, is mind-blowing.  Small changes in system conditions can have huge 
effects on prices due to the short-time horizon of this dispatch algorithm and the 
reliability requirements of the NYISO.  With such potential for extreme price 
variability, it is not surprising that the estimated models for this market do not perform 
nearly as well as those estimated for the Day-Ahead Market.  As Table 4-5 indicates, 
three of the four models are able to explain between 70 to 75% of the variability in 
LBMP, with the remaining model explaining slightly more than 65%.  
Table 4-5: Estimated Supply Models for NYISO RTM 
R-Squared
Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic
Intercept 0.0166 15.54 0.0080 5.38 0.0050 2.90 0.0028 1.47
Intercept Shifters
Daily Sine Curve 0.0005 1.36 0.0009 2.83 0.0000 -0.14 -0.0009 -2.99
Daily Cosine Curve -0.0011 -2.98 -0.0004 -1.44 -0.0003 -1.03 -0.0006 -1.81
Tuesday -0.0011 -1.79 0.0003 0.39 -0.0009 -1.16 0.0006 0.81
Wednesday 0.0000 0.03 0.0002 0.19 -0.0009 -0.84 0.0009 1.01
Thursday 0.0013 1.57 0.0005 0.56 0.0006 0.55 0.0009 1.01
Friday 0.0020 3.27 0.0009 1.21 0.0006 0.55 0.0021 3.04
Holiday 0.0127 3.12 0.0037 1.05 0.0044 1.58 0.0011 0.35
RTM Load 0.0791 1.69 -0.0449 -1.36 -0.2748 -5.47 0.2792 2.88
Slope Shifters
Wgt. Constraint Mins. N/A N/A -0.0013 -4.90 -0.0013 -4.73 -0.0009 -2.69
Wgt. Trans. Outages 0.0000 -2.31 0.0000 -1.38 0.0000 -3.14 0.0000 -3.08
mp. Heat Index (THI) -0.0023 -10.14 -0.0010 -4.54 -0.0009 -3.76 -0.0001 -0.34
Max Yesterday THI -0.0015 -6.57 0.0013 5.98 0.0021 7.64 0.0007 3.50
ositive Forecast Error 0.0000 -6.96 0.0000 -0.88 0.0000 2.61 0.0000 0.54
egative Forecast Error -0.0002 -10.48 0.0000 -1.57 0.0000 -0.08 N/A N/A
AM Coverage of RTM 0.3399 6.68 0.0839 3.19 0.2612 5.26 -0.2911 -3.16
EDRP Event Day -0.0508 -3.10 -0.0702 -3.94 -0.0628 -4.54 -0.0481 -3.23
See Equation (17)
Western NY Hudson River New York City Long Island
0.626 0.741 0.717 0.732  67
Most of the coefficients correspond with a priori expectations in terms of the 
direction of their effects.  The transmission constraint minutes indicate that has the 
congestion on the system increases, so too will the price flexibility.  In the case of 
transmission outages, having less capacity available to transmit electricity corresponds 
with a steeper slope for the supply curve.  When the temperature is hotter and when 
the NYISO under-forecasts the real-time load in the DAM, the supply flexibility is 
shown to be larger.  Not surprisingly, on EDRP event days, the supply curve was 
exceptionally steep. The remaining variables require some explanation. 
Incorporating yesterday’s maximum temperature in the real-time supply model 
is intended to incorporate longer-term effects of temperature on price.  With this in 
mind, one would expect the sign on the parameter estimate for this variable to be 
negative (i.e. as yesterday’s temperature increases, the supply flexibility increases).  
However, such is not the case except in the Western NY region.  Just as the THI 
variable seemed to have the wrong sign but could be explained based on competitive 
bidding strategies, the same could hold true for yesterday’s THI value.  If the system is 
in the middle of a heat wave, lower priced units have little incentive to bid up the price 
of electricity since they are unlikely to be on the margin.  Thus, they would reduce 
their prices to be closer to marginal cost in order to ensure dispatch, thereby receiving 
the higher expected LBMP. 
Another parameter that did not produce the expected results is the positive 
forecast error.  Here, one would anticipate that when the NYISO over forecasts load, it 
would over-commit units in the DAM.  When the load comes in lower in real-time, 
there is an over-abundance of resources lined up to serve it.  If these unneeded units 
are all peakers, than the reduction in price may be minimal, indicating a small 
reduction in the supply flexibility.  Such is the case in New York City and Long 
Island, where the majority of the load is served by higher priced mid-merit and   68
peaking suppliers. However, if the bulk of the capacity is comprised of base and mid-
merit units, like it is in the Hudson River and Western NY superzone, backing down 
one of these units could cause the price to drop substantially, a manifestation of a 
higher supply flexibility.  
The third variable that seems at odds with a priori expectations is the DAM 
coverage variable.  In this case, the more load that is procured through bilateral 
contracts and Day-Ahead commitments would cause the slope of the supply curve to 
become less steep.  Units have already received their revenue from these contracts and 
have little reason to compete with others.  They are more concerned about meeting 
their obligation to serve load than dicker with the market.  However, the estimated 
models indicate such is not the case in Long Island, where the vast majority of load is 
covered through bilaterals.  In this case, it may be that this variable is simply collinear 
with load.  At high expected load levels, LIPA moves the bulk of its requirements not 
covered through bilaterals into the DAM, unwilling to take a risk on the more volatile 
real-time market for even a small part of their load that may not be hedged.  Peaking 
units that anticipate being at or near the margin, slightly bid up their capacity knowing 
how import constrained is the Island.  So in real-time, the higher offers from peakers 
not scheduled in the DAM, now get taken to serve load in real-time.  Since these units 
are at or close to the margin, they cause the supply flexibility to increase.  
Supply Price Flexibility Estimates   
As in the Day-Ahead market, the inclusion of shifter variables in the models 
contributes greatly to the wide variability in the supply flexibility estimates.  As Table 
4-6 illustrates, not only do the ranges increase as you move from the Western part of 
the state down the Hudson to NYC and Long Island but so do the average price 
flexibilities.  At the extreme, a 1% reduction in load would generate nearly a 20% 
reduction in either NYC or Long Island.  It is surprising that such maximums are so   69
far below those observed in the DAM – in orders of magnitude between 2 and 15.  
One would think the longer-term view that SCUC has would make for smaller effects 
on price when load changes, but such is simply not the case.  Further research into this 
finding is beyond the scope of this research, but comports with previous analysis on 
this data (Neenan et al., 2002, Neenan et al., 2003, and Neenan et al., 2004).   
The large negative flexibilies in several of the regions is most likely a result of 
the non-linear nature of SCD.  Strictly defined, negative supply flexibilities indicate 
that as load is reduced, prices actually increase.  This anomalous result could be due to 
start-up costs and minimum run time constraints many generators have and the 
inability of SCD to look more than several minutes ahead.  The market could incur a 
large startup cost from a unit, because the NYISO needs its capacity in the immediate 
future, that it can’t get from a cheaper unit that is unable to ramp up quickly enough. If 
the unit is needed in the next several intervals, but then is no longer needed, market 
rules stipulate that this unit must remain on-line until it had completed its minimum 
run time.  Thus, a cheaper unit would have to be backed down instead, causing prices 
to be higher than they otherwise needed to be.  It is noteworthy that the negative price 
flexibility estimates appear in areas of the state with higher proportions of base-load 
and mid-merit capacity.    
Representative supply curves at the minimum, average, and maximum values 
of the shifter variables are displayed in Figure 4-5 – 4-8.  As in the DAM, the shifter 
variables don’t play a major role in altering the shape of the supply curve at their 
minimum to average values.  However, when these variables reach their global 
maximum values, the supply curves dramatically change both in slope and location.  
The value of demand response can truly be realized during such times, in helping the 
system avoid outages, mitigate market power and improve social welfare. 
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Figure 4-5: Estimated Supply Function for NYISO RTM Western NY Superzone
Table 4-6: Estimated Supply Price Flexibilities for NYISO RTM 
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Less than 0
Between 0 and 1
Between 1 and 2
Between 2 and 4
Between 4 and 8
Between 8 and 16
Between 16 and 32
Greater than 32
Western NY Hudson River New York City Long Island
73
9
60
6
0.65
2.64
19.89
-1.22
1
0
10
17
192
226
1
0
8
15
184
254
9
0
0
0
39
46
304
130
0
0
0
0
68
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CHAPTER 5 
SIMULATION SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS 
 
Using the statistical representation of the short-term market supply curves 
estimated in Chapter 4, a series of simulations are undertaken in this chapter to show 
how demand response can both increase the efficiency of wholesale electricity markets 
and provide for a more secure bulk power grid.  In the former, demand response can 
increase net social welfare by ensuring societal resources go to their best use.  The 
theory, which was highlighted in Chapter 3, is applied through a simulation over the 
summer of 2001 assuming different representations of the demand for electricity and 
using the previously developed market supply curves from Chapter 4.  A second issue 
to be discussed is the role of demand response in ensuring stable and reliable bulk 
transmission systems.  Due to the public good nature of reliability, demand response 
programs that pay participants for curtailing load during system emergencies and tariff 
rates that charge a commodity price commensurate with these extreme market 
conditions have been developed to ensure sufficient resources are available to mitigate 
the detrimental affects of an unstable system.  This theory was also outlined in Chapter 
3 and is applied in a simulation over the summer of 2001.  
Simulated Social Welfare Effects of Demand Response 
Although Boisvert and Neenan (2004) provided the theoretical foundation for 
analyzing the welfare implications of allowing customers on a flat-rate tariff to be 
responsive to price through economic demand response programs, they did not attempt 
to empirically estimate the level of demand response needed to generate positive 
changes in net social welfare.  In what follows is a simulation undertaken to answer 
this question: How much is enough?  
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As explained in Chapter 3, customers on a flat-rate tariff never see the actual 
wholesale price of electricity.  The implications of which are customers will under-
consume in periods when the wholesale price is below the tariff rate, and over-
consume in periods when the price exceeds the tariff.  Such a lack of information 
results in social welfare losses, as consumers are unable to efficiently allocate 
resources to their best uses.  In order to estimate the amount of demand response 
needed to improve social welfare, there are two necessary ingredients: a supply curve 
and a demand curve.  The supply curve was statistically estimated in the previous 
chapter and will serve as the basis for this simulation.  A simple linear demand 
schedule is developed using elasticities derived from actual customers on Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corporation’s RTP rate (Goldman et al., 2004), who would be 
expected to act in a similar fashion to those in a day-ahead economic demand response 
program.   
Several assumptions used in the simulation must be highlighted to put the 
results in the correct context.  First, it is assumed that customers will not undertake 
load curtailments unless the economic conditions are right to do so.  Since the average 
flat-rate tariff price in the State of New York is slightly below $100/MWh, it is 
assumed that customers will not reduce consumption at prices less than the tariff rate.
1  
Thus, the demand curve is perfectly vertical below $100/MWh, and is initially set to 
have an elasticity that ranges between –0.40 to –0.05.
2  It is further assumed, that only 
5% of load is actually price-responsive under purely economic conditions.  In the 
second simulation, this assumption is relaxed since customers have freely shown their 
                                                 
1 According to Neenan et al. (2002), there are several end-use customers in the state willing to curtail 
electricity at prices well below this $100/MWh threshold.  Although many argue that these bids are 
legitimate and economically viable, they are more likely the exception and not the rule.  Since this 
analysis is intended to cover the vast majority of electricity consumers in the State, a price consistent 
with the observed behavior of the “average” customer will be used. 
2 These are comparable to those estimated in Goldman et al. (2004), Schwartz et al. (2002), and Patrick 
and Wolak (1997).  
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willingness to provide much larger curtailments when system emergencies are 
imminent.  Finally, the ability for participants in DADRP to “buy-through” their 
forward contract in the RTM, thus resorting back to their flat-rate tariff, necessitates a 
comparison of the combined deadweight loss that exists in both the DAM and RTM 
and the curtailment payment to test for an improvement in net social welfare. 
This simulation calculates the minimum amount of economic demand response 
needed to generate positive net social welfare benefits.  It focuses on the same time 
frame and areas of New York State used in the estimation of the supply curves.  If 
more than 5% of load is required to generate positive welfare benefits, or alternatively 
no amount of demand response will improve social welfare, because of the slope and 
location of the supply curves, then no load is scheduled to come off the system.  In 
general, the steeper is the supply curve, the more likely demand response will generate 
positive social welfare benefits.   
Simulation Results 
The results of this simulation are displayed in Table 5-1.  In the western part of 
New York State, there were a limited number of opportunities for demand response to 
participate in the markets.  Due to the relatively low average price-flexibility during 
the majority of the summer, the opportunities for demand response to generate positive 
net social welfare benefits were further limited.  When even the highest demand 
elasticity was used, there were only four hours when demand response would have 
been scheduled under conditions where the costs to more efficiently allocate resources 
was sufficient to off-set the deadweight loss.  The high DAM supply flexibilities 
observed during these few hours corresponded with negative flexibilities in the RTM.  
Due to the non-linear nature of SCD, the NYISO’s real-time market dispatch 
algorithm, it is possible to get negative supply flexibilities because an increase in load 
would allow for a small expensive but flexible unit to be turned off and a large   
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Table 5-1: Simulated Social Welfare Effects of Demand Response  
Zone Elasticity
# of 
Event 
Hours
Avg. 
DR 
MW
Avg. 
NSW 
Gain
Avg Chg. 
DAM 
LBMP
Avg. 
DAM 
SF
Avg. 
RTM 
SF
Western NY -0.40 4 339 11 -53% 28.5 -6.0
-0.35 4 358 16 -54% 28.5 -6.0
-0.30 3 354 14 -53% 28.0 -6.5
-0.25 2 365 10 -55% 28.7 -6.3
-0.20 1 409 5 -60% 30.8 -5.3
-0.15 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
-0.10 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
-0.05 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Hudson River -0.40 11 52 38 -14% 21.1 -3.9
-0.35 11 54 38 -14% 21.1 -3.9
-0.30 11 57 32 -14% 21.1 -3.9
-0.25 11 61 34 -15% 21.1 -3.9
-0.20 10 44 33 -14% 22.3 -3.8
-0.15 10 51 35 -15% 22.3 -3.8
-0.10 8 31 43 -11% 23.1 -4.0
-0.05 6 8 56 -5% 22.2 -4.8
New York City -0.40 17 21 36 -4% 15.0 5.5
-0.35 17 22 37 -4% 15.0 5.5
-0.30 17 22 35 -4% 15.0 5.5
-0.25 17 23 37 -4% 15.0 5.5
-0.20 17 24 37 -5% 15.0 5.5
-0.15 16 26 40 -5% 15.3 5.4
-0.10 15 18 39 -3% 14.4 5.5
-0.05 14 5 42 -1% 13.9 5.5
Long Island -0.40 26 4 105 -1% 13.9 2.8
-0.35 26 4 105 -1% 13.9 2.8
-0.30 26 4 105 -1% 13.9 2.8
-0.25 26 6 105 -1% 13.9 2.8
-0.20 25 1 109 0% 13.7 2.8
-0.15 25 1 109 0% 13.7 2.8
-0.10 25 1 109 0% 13.7 2.8
-0.05 25 1 108 0% 13.7 2.8 
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inexpensive and relatively inflexible unit to increase output in the necessary block 
increment.
3  This odd coincidence may help to explain the large amount of demand 
response required.  Interestingly, at low elasticities, there is no amount of demand 
response that would be able to offset the deadweight loss from flat-rate tariffs – in 
other words, the payments to elicit such load reductions exceed the deadweight losses 
they are intended to negate. 
In comparison to Western NY, the Hudson River superzone has over three 
times as many hours scheduled for curtailments, where only 20% of the Western NY 
demand response is required to offset the deadweight loss.  A similar situation is 
observed with the DAM and RTM supply flexibilities, which further bolsters the claim 
for why such a relatively large amount of demand response is required.  In this area of 
the state, however, it is possible to generate positive net social welfare benefits even 
under the smallest assumed demand elasticity.   
As one progresses further down the Hudson River into New York City and 
Long Island, even fewer MWs of demand response are required to create positive net 
social welfare benefits.  In these two zones, the estimated flexibilities during event 
hours is lower in the DAM than in the other two locales but positive in the both 
markets, resulting in the need for less demand response since the deadweight losses in 
both markets are offset by the single DADRP payment.  There would have been over 
14 event hours in New York City regardless of the assumed demand elasticity, with 26 
event hours declared in Long Island.  A priori, one would assume that demand 
response would have a large affect in these two parts of the state.  However, these 
results indicate that almost any amount of demand response is beneficial downstate, 
but only a large amount helps improve social welfare outside of the metropolitan area. 
                                                 
3 Similar findings of negative supply flexibilities are reported in Neenan et al. (2002), Neenan et al. 
(2003), and Neenan et al. (2004).  
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Simulated Reliability Effects of Demand Response 
As previously stated, demand response not only can improve market 
efficiency, but it also has a role to play in improving the reliable operation of the bulk 
power grid by curtailing load when system reserves run short.  What follows is a 
simulation to show what the optimal price would need to be to induce the proper 
amount of load response to ensure reserve margins are never violated.  This price 
could either be paid to emergency demand response participants as an incentive to 
curtail load, or alternatively could be used as the price for electricity in a Critical Peak 
Pricing (CPP) rate to achieve the same result.   
As in the previous simulation, the demand curve to be used is linear, 
incorporates a demand elasticity that ranges between –0.40 and –0.05, and has no 
change in consumption for prices below $100/MWh.  However, for purposes of this 
simulation, the highest observed zonal load in the summer of 2001 is assumed to be 
equal to the maximum amount of available generation in each zone.  Clearly 
generation is not zone specific, since it travels along the bulk power grid into adjacent 
and even far-reaching areas of the state and beyond. However, for simplicity, each 
zone is assumed to have a maximum level of load that it can serve to maintain reserve 
margins, which are assumed to range between 5% to 20%.  Thus, no additional load 
will be served when demand exceeds this threshold. 
The simulation takes this level of maximum demand that can be served and 
finds the hours during the summer of 2001 when load would have to be shed.  Since 
price is used as “the carrot” to induce load curtailments, instead of through forced 
outages as “the stick”, the demand curve is used to derive the price that would bring 
about this required level of demand response, either by paying people to curtail or 
charging them to consume.  
 
79
Simulation Results 
Figures 5-1 through 5-4 display the results of the simulation. The surfaces 
represent the average price over all events that would be forthcoming assuming the 
specified elasticity and reserve margin.  As one would expect, when customers are 
highly elastic and the reserve margin is small, a relatively low price is required to 
induce the necessary level of demand reductions to maintain reserve levels.  However, 
as the reserve margin increases, so too does the necessary price to elicit load 
curtailments.  Similarly, as the responsiveness of customers is decreased, a higher 
price is demanded by consumers to achieve the necessary levels of demand response.   
In the two downstate regions, New York City and Long Island, there is never a 
time when an average price higher than $250/MWh is required to produce the desired 
results.  The same holds true for the Western NY region.  However, when you move to 
the Hudson River superzone, prices closer to $275/MWh are required in the most 
extreme conditions.  The fact that a higher average price is required in the Hudson 
River superzone to elicit the necessary levels of demand response to maintain zonal 
reserve margins is due to the fact that “emergency” events in this locale are called 
when the load exceeds the reserve margin by a larger amount than in other zones. Put 
differently, proportionally more load must come off the system in the Hudson River 
superzone than in any other area during events to keep the system operating reliably.  
In order to curtail this additional load, a higher price would be demanded by end-use 
customers.   
If these results are compared with those under the more traditional way 
emergency programs are run, it is possible to show how system operators receive more 
than they need to meet reserve margins.  Table 5-2 indicates the level of demand 
response that would be forthcoming when customer’s elasticity is assumed to be a 
modest –0.05 and there is a 10% reserve margin requirement. Across the State, a price  
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Figure 5-1: Simulated Reliability Effects for Western NY Superzone 
Figure 5-2: Simulated Reliability Effects for Hudson River Superzone  
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Figure 5-3: Simulated Reliability Effects for New York City 
Figure 5-4: Simulated Reliability Effects for Long Island  
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between $185/MWh and $205/MWh would be required, on average, to exactly 
maintain reserve margins.  However, if the price were instead set at $500/MWh, as in 
EDRP, between 3.7 to 4.6 times as much demand response would have been 
forthcoming.  Market participants, who collectively pay for these resources through 
uplift charges, would have been required to pay over $160 million while only 
receiving roughly $40 million in reliability benefits.
4  However, under a more ideal 
dispatch scenario, payments totaling only $14 million would have been required to 
elicit the exact amount of demand response needed to provide the necessary level of 
reserves.  If these resources were instead procured through a tariff rate, the reliability 
benefits come free of charge.    
 
                                                 
4 Reliability benefits are calculated according to the formula described in Neenan et al. (2002):  The 
change in the Loss of Load Probability (∆ LOLP) is multiplied by the Value of Lost Load (VOLL) and 
amount of load at risk of an outage.  As Table 4-2 indicates, the ∆ LOLP is assumed to be a modest 
0.10, VOLL is assumed to be $2,500/MWh, also modest according to recent outage cost studies 
(Primen, 2001 and Tavis, 2003), and 10% of the load during an event is assumed to be at risk of an 
outage.   
Zone Min Avg Max
Western NY 84 $101 $187 $300 390 1,757 -1.3 $18,447,022
Hudson River 51 $103 $205 $300 323 1,207 0.1 $7,693,035
New York City 36 $100 $185 $300 504 2,325 5.8 $10,463,747
Long Island 42 $103 $188 $300 138 614 4.1 $3,223,060
Results assume an elasticity of -0.05 and a demand threshold of 90% of maximum demand
** Reliability benefits assume a change in LOLP of 0.10, a VOLL of $2,500/MW, and 10% of load at risk of an 
outage
* EDRP participants are paid the higher of $500/MWh or LBMP. For this simulation, the $500/MWh price was used 
DR Price # of Events 
Hours
Avg. DR 
MW
Avg. EDRP 
MW*
Avg. RTM 
SF
DR Reliability 
Benefits**
Table 5-2: Estimated Demand Response Reliability Benefits  83 
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis provides both the theoretical framework and the empirical results to 
illustrate how demand response can contribute directly to wholesale electricity 
markets.  There are two components to this contribution.  One component relates to 
improvements in social welfare measured in terms of increases in economic 
efficiency.  The second is in terms of increased system reliability. 
To quantify the importance of demand response in terms of wholesale market 
efficiency, this thesis focuses on economic-based programs, like the NYISO’s Day-
Ahead Demand Response Program (DADRP) and real-time pricing (RTP) tariffs.  
Since most the largest electricity consumers (e.g. industrial and commercial 
customers) still buy electricity at flat-rates, economic efficiency can be improved 
through demand reductions when prices are above the flat-rate.  It can be shown that 
when prices are in excess of this rate, the cost of electricity is above its value to these 
customers and there are accompanying deadweight social losses.  By allowing 
customers to bid into the Day-Ahead Market where they are compensated for load 
reductions through DADRP, efficiency is improved if the energy payments are less 
than the deadweight loss.  When customers respond to contemporaneous prices 
through RTP, the deadweight loss is always removed without the associated payment. 
Targeted demand response during times of system reserve shortfalls can also 
help realign the system and restore reliability.  The NYISO’s Emergency Demand 
Response Program (EDRP) and critical peak pricing (CPP) rates can be invoked when 
reliability is compromised.  If enough demand response is forthcoming, the system is 
brought back into line within acceptable reliability limits. 
Empirically for this thesis, econometric representations of New York’s short-
run market supply curves are estimated and subsequently used to quantify exactly how   84
much demand response is needed in different locales within the state of New York to 
meet reliability requirements and improve social welfare. In the latter, the simulations 
generate the amount of demand response needed by location to equate the reduction in 
deadweight loss to the payments required to achieve them under DADRP. The 
reliability simulations calculate the critical price necessary in each area of the state to 
consistently maintain reserve margins.  Both simulations apply to the 528 peak hours 
of the summer months of 2001, the first summer these demand response programs 
were in effect and a time in which there were a substantial number of high prices 
during these peak hours. A range of different response elasticities is used to test the 
sensitivity of the empirical results. 
In examining day-ahead demand response programs, the simulations illustrate 
dramatically how a little load relief goes a long way, particularly in heavily congested 
areas.  For example, less than 5% of the summer weekday peak hours generate 
positive net social welfare benefits on Long Island, with even fewer hours elsewhere 
(3% in NYC, 2% in the Hudson River superzone, and less than 1% in Western NY).  
During the numerous hours when net social welfare is not improved, the efficiency 
losses are relatively small and thus do not warrant the required payments.   
Social welfare benefits also result from a small reduction in load in percentage 
terms.  Less than two-tenths of one percent (0.2%) of maximum zonal load is needed 
to be price-responsive in either New York or Long Island to improve social welfare.  
The Hudson River superzone, which is still congested but not nearly as much as in the 
City and the Island, requires slightly more (0.5%).  In the part of the state with the 
least amount of congestion (i.e. Western NY), fully 5% of maximum zonal load must 
be forthcoming to ensure social welfare is improved.   
Congestion further drives the price at which welfare benefits are realized.  The 
average day-ahead LBMP that brought forth these improvements in net social welfare   85
is over $400/MWh in both the Western NY and Hudson River superzones, but around 
$300/MWh in New York City and only $250/MWh on Long Island.  
Locational congestion does not appear to play quite as important a role when 
demand response contributes to a more reliable bulk power system.  However, the 
results do show that some areas violate reserve margins by a larger proportional 
amount than others.  In the hours when the Hudson River superzone violated a 10% 
reserve margin, over 5% of load was needed on average to come off the system, in 
comparison to roughly 4% of load in the other three locales across the State.  Thus, 
areas on the bulk power system with a high load factor need more demand response 
resources to help maintain reliability levels, than areas with a lower load factor. 
Under a variety of assumption about the level of demand response, the 
reliability simulation results also clearly demonstrate that paying EDRP customers 
$500/MWh generally produces more load reduction that is needed to restore the 
system.  The estimated critical prices for demand response are upper bounds because 
of data limitations – reserves cannot be shared across the system.  Clearly, if reserve-
sharing could have been accounted for, the critical prices needed to restore the system 
would probably have been lower.  
As in the welfare simulations, the number of times these resources are needed 
to provide reserves is limited.  Historically, less than 23 hours of reliability demand 
response events have been called in New York State.
1  Since the simulations for this 
thesis assume no additional generation is available to meet load in excess of observed 
maximum demand, events were called on a much more frequent basis.  As the amount 
of excess generation increases, the number of reliability based events decreases.  This 
                                                 
1 During the first year of EDRP, 23 number of hours were declared downstate while the program was 
only invoked for 18 hours elsewhere.  Since then, the number of program hours has been steadily 
declining.   86
infrequency of opportunities makes demand response a viable substitute for peaking 
generation in the short-run.  
The results from these empirical simulations of the demand response programs 
in New York State’s electricity market have important policy implications.  
Historically, some regulated utilities introduced interruptible load programs.  At that 
time, these utilities were in large measure responsible for the reliability of their own 
system, and the interruptible load programs provided a means of avoiding building 
new peaking generation.  The discounts provided to those customers’ willing to 
participate in such interruptible load programs were justified using an avoided cost 
argument.  The lost revenue to the utility from the discounts was smaller than the cost 
of citing and constructing a new generator to meet peak demand for only a small 
number of hours a year or season.  At the point where the number of customers needed 
to provide sufficient load relief and the frequency it was needed to maintain reliability 
caused the discounts to exceed the cost of a new unit, the utility could undertake the 
investment in new generation.   
With the creation of competitive electricity markets in New York State, the 
NYISO has assumed responsibility for market efficiency and system reliability.  As a 
way to meet this responsibility, the NYISO, in 2001, recognized the potential value of 
demand response resources and implemented the DADRP and EDRP.  The challenge 
now is to see that there is a sufficient mix of resources in the correct locations on the 
grid to maximize the effectiveness of the programs. 
To guarantee the effectiveness of the programs, several obstacles must be 
overcome.  First, system operators must have confidence that demand response will be 
forthcoming when it is needed.  During the summer of 2001, the first year EDRP was 
in effect, dispatchers were skeptical about the role of demand response in helping the 
system maintain reserve margins.  However, much of the skepticism is now gone as   87
system operators have observed that when events were called, the load dropping off 
the system was in amounts that have become more and more predictable as the 
program has evolved.   
Another obstacle is that program providers must be shown where participation 
can be of most value.  Without such guidance from either policy-makers or ISOs, 
these providers will have little basis for assessing the benefits to them or their 
customer participants.  
In order to attract program participants in areas where congestion is high, 
marketing efforts must be targeted to such areas. Education and outreach efforts on the 
part of state agencies, like public utility commissions and publicly funded research and 
development entities, facilitate the educational process by training potential 
participants on how to respond to price and evaluate alternative load management 
strategies. To contribute to these efforts, the New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority (NYSERDA) has helped to finance projects such as demand 
response audits, interval meter installation, and informational brochures to help make 
customers aware of the value inherent in reducing load under specified conditions. 
In comparing current levels of participation with what is probably needed, 
these simulation results suggest that participation in DADRP is too low. Further, the 
small number of participants are concentrated in upstate New York, and not in areas in 
which the limited transmission capacity results in severe congestion (e.g. New York 
City and Long Island).  Such constrained areas are a prime location for broader 
economic program participation, irrespective of the welfare situation where so few 
MWs are needed, but customers in these areas have been slow to enroll. Education and 
outreach efforts could play a key role in increasing the size of the program in these 
areas by showing customers the value of participation even under such flat market 
conditions as have been experienced over the past two years.    88
Customers in congested areas have been far more willing to join EDRP, the 
NYISO’s reliability based demand response program.  These resources, however, have 
often been dispatched in excess of what was required to maintain reserve margins 
(Neenan et al. 2002 and 2003). As this analysis illustrates, the current rules for EDRP 
would have resulted in the NYISO over-paying for resources during the summer of 
2001 by over $120 million when it could have secured exactly what was needed with a 
more flexible and dynamic set of dispatch rules, perhaps based on critical peak 
pricing.  It is uncertain what impact such changes in the program’s design would have 
on participation rates.  However, allowing for a guaranteed payment level to be set 
when the event notification is issued could mitigate these detrimental effects.  
Although there would still be imperfect forecasting, such a method would improve 
upon the current situation dramatically.  Such rule changes would also allow for better 
pricing signals to be sent to the market during times of reserve shortages because a 
more representative value for another MW of electricity would be incorporated into 
the real-time market pricing algorithm. 
In summary, in addition to providing some guidance for program changes to 
improve the performance of the NYISO’s current demand response programs, this 
analysis also contributes to the national debate over enrollment goals and design 
standards for demand response programs.  To date, FERC has yet to provide firm 
participation targets for ISOs to follow nor has it substantially questioned the floor 
price used in many ISO emergency demand response programs. Instead, FERC seems 
inclined to cling to the idea that one can never have too much of a good thing.  This 
research has demonstrated that, at least in the case of the New York electricity market, 
this is not the case.  Clearly, to complete an evaluation of the value of demand 
response programs from a national perspective, more in-depth analyses that   89
encompass a longer time frame and include other ISOs from across the country are 
required. 90 
APPENDIX A 
ADDITIONAL ECONOMETRIC MODEL RESULTS 
 
The estimated supply models were assumed to have serially correlated error 
structures that were conditionally heteroscedastic (ARCH).  Estimates of the error 
structure are provided in Tables A-1 (DAM supply model), A-3 (RTM load 
forecasting model), and A-4 (RTM supply model) below.  The other tables (A-2, A-4, 
and A-6) contain the results of statistical tests for white noise residuals, adjusted for 
the reduction in degrees of freedom due to the AR process.   
In the DAM, the full 16 period lag structure does not produce significant 
estimates in any of the 4 zones. The one period AR coefficient is the only lag that is 
significant across all estimated regions.  Two out of the four zones have statistically 
significant coefficients at the 5% level for the 8-period lag, while only one has a 
significant coefficient at this level for the 16-period lag.  The ARCH process is also 
inconsistent across the four zones, producing significant results in the Hudson River 
superzone and New York City, not so elsewhere.  The residuals only exhibit white 
noise behavior in the Hudson River superzone and Long Island.  Alternative 
specifications for this AR error structure were attempted to produce white noise 
residuals, but estimates for the model variables changed, dramatically so in some 
cases, and never generated truly random errors in all cases.  For this reason, the initial 
specification is maintained. 
Because the real-time market load is expected to be highly correlated with real-
time market LBMPs, an instrumental variable approach is used in the estimation of the 
real-time market supply curves.  Real-time load is forecasted using a quadratic 
functional form, which is also expected to exhibit serial correlation.  To remove this 
effect, a 16-period AR process is included in the error process.  The statistical 
significance of the lag periods differ across the different zones, with the exception of   91
the first, eighth, ninth and sixteenth.  As in the DAM, both the Hudson River 
superzone and Long Island models produce white noise residuals.  Since the last lag in 
the AR(16) process is significant, it did not seem appropriate to alter the length of the 
autoregressive structure. 
The results of the RTM forecasting model are used as the principal explanatory 
variable in the real-time supply model.  The dispatch algorithm, SCD, incorporates a 
much shorter time frame than its day-ahead counterpart, SCUC.  Therefore, this 
market’s supply model is assumed to have a shorter memory in the error process (i.e. 
AR(8)) but was also expected to exhibit volatility clustering.  As in the other models, 
not all the lags in the autoregressive error process are significant across all four zones. 
Unlike the day-ahead models, though, all the ARCH terms are statistically significant.  
A test of the residuals shows that they exhibit white noise behavior, indicating that the 
chosen representation of the error structure is acceptable.   92
 
 
 
 
 
Table A-2: White Noise Residuals Test of NYISO DAM Supply Models 
Lag
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
6 1.66 - 0.28 - 1.73 - 0.68 -
12 2.72 - 0.68 - 8.93 - 1.67 -
18 8.86 0.0119 1.6 0.4493 20.36 0.0000 5.74 0.0567
24 16.78 0.0325 4.24 0.8348 30.12 0.0002 8.28 0.4066
Western NY Hudson River New York City Long Island
Table A-1: Estimated Error Structure for NYISO DAM Supply Models 
Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic
AR1 -0.8771 -15.27 -0.7874 -11.05 -0.9034 -15.57 -0.7208 -11.81
AR2 -0.0219 -0.29 -0.0199 -0.23 0.0291 0.46 -0.0889 -1.29
AR3 -0.0304 -0.36 -0.0108 -0.13 0.0491 0.81 0.1216 2.09
AR4 0.0296 0.39 -0.0202 -0.23 0.0041 0.07 -0.0701 -1.17
AR5 -0.0179 -0.23 -0.0171 -0.21 -0.0674 -1.15 -0.0053 -0.09
AR6 -0.0466 -0.71 -0.0657 -0.77 0.0722 1.30 -0.1002 -1.63
AR7 -0.0313 -0.44 0.0626 0.86 0.0607 1.45 0.0823 1.41
AR8 0.0406 0.71 -0.2420 -4.62 -0.2159 -5.74 -0.0758 -1.41
AR9 0.0159 0.23 0.1965 2.79 0.0139 0.26 -0.0538 -0.93
AR10 -0.0114 -0.14 0.0065 0.08 0.0359 0.75 0.0908 1.35
AR11 0.0240 0.25 0.0466 0.60 0.0954 2.13 0.0124 0.20
AR12 -0.0412 -0.44 -0.0857 -1.02 -0.0852 -1.50 0.0727 1.26
AR13 -0.0020 -0.02 0.0280 0.33 0.0227 0.41 0.0370 0.53
AR14 0.0279 0.32 0.0156 0.18 -0.0062 -0.11 -0.0482 -0.67
AR15 -0.0145 -0.19 0.0663 0.92 -0.0494 -1.07 0.0042 0.07
AR16 -0.0336 -0.58 -0.0757 -1.52 0.0651 2.05 -0.0449 -0.92
ARCH0 0.0000 20.30 0.0000 21.77 0.0000 11.91 0.0000 14.49
ARCH1 0.0184 0.61 0.0831 2.50 0.7709 6.59 0.0248 0.50
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Table A-4: White Noise Residuals Test of NYISO RTM Load Forecasting Models
Lag
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
6 0.61 - 0.06 - 0.22 - 0.15 -
12 12.41 - 0.29 - 1.43 - 1.11 -
18 23.61 0.0000 0.86 0.6505 5.41 0.0669 2.92 0.2322
24 30.12 0.0002 4.04 0.8535 15.18 0.0557 9.83 0.2772
Western NY Hudson River New York City Long Island
Table A-3: Estimated Error Structure for NYISO RTM Load Forecasting 
Models 
Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic
AR1 0.8287 18.52 0.9750 21.73 0.9755 21.85 0.9671 21.69
AR2 0.1158 1.98 0.0395 0.63 0.0262 0.42 0.0267 0.43
AR3 -0.0187 -0.32 -0.0305 -0.49 0.0147 0.24 0.0557 0.90
AR4 0.0675 1.16 0.0230 0.37 0.0747 1.20 -0.0023 -0.04
AR5 0.0309 0.53 -0.0869 -1.39 -0.0840 -1.35 -0.0250 -0.40
AR6 -0.0536 -0.92 -0.0110 -0.18 -0.0769 -1.23 -0.0714 -1.15
AR7 -0.1682 -2.89 0.0815 1.31 -0.0105 -0.17 -0.0505 -0.81
AR8 0.5272 9.53 0.2291 3.69 0.2679 4.23 0.3023 4.87
AR9 -0.4571 -8.27 -0.2111 -3.38 -0.2865 -4.48 -0.2872 -4.53
AR10 0.0430 0.73 -0.0665 -1.06 0.0514 0.80 0.0415 0.66
AR11 0.1185 2.02 0.0388 0.62 0.0654 1.02 0.0427 0.68
AR12 -0.0421 -0.72 -0.0406 -0.64 0.0136 0.21 0.0597 0.94
AR13 -0.0253 -0.43 -0.0003 0.00 -0.0354 -0.56 -0.0852 -1.35
AR14 -0.1322 -2.25 0.0255 0.40 -0.0696 -1.09 -0.0278 -0.44
AR15 0.0101 0.17 -0.0758 -1.20 -0.0265 -0.42 -0.0505 -0.79
AR16 0.1130 2.49 0.0794 1.75 0.0880 1.94 0.0951 2.09
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Table A-6: White Noise Residuals Test for NYISO RTM Supply Models 
Lag
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
Chi-   
Square
Pr > Chi-
Sq
6 8.91 - 2.59 - 3.44 - 0.33 -
12 14.29 0.0064 4.54 0.3378 7.25 0.1233 0.81 0.9371
18 16.09 0.0971 15.80 0.1055 12.23 0.2700 1.01 0.9998
24 19.27 0.2549 21.48 0.1608 17.63 0.3460 7.57 0.9606
Western NY Hudson River New York City Long Island
Table A-5: Estimated Error Structure for NYISO RTM Supply Models 
Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic Parm. Est. t-Statistic
AR1 -0.2760 -3.97 -0.4136 -6.48 -0.4543 -7.31 -0.5496 -9.55
AR2 0.0711 1.16 -0.0852 -1.32 -0.0983 -1.78 -0.0877 -1.37
AR3 0.0334 0.88 -0.0569 -1.07 0.0219 0.52 -0.0981 -1.90
AR4 0.0201 0.42 -0.1291 -2.40 -0.0751 -1.58 -0.0284 -0.51
AR5 -0.0224 -0.56 0.0593 1.29 0.0487 1.01 -0.0296 -0.62
AR6 -0.0180 -0.38 0.0704 1.47 0.0148 0.31 0.0906 1.90
AR7 -0.0081 -0.25 -0.0140 -0.29 -0.0418 -0.86 -0.0467 -0.86
AR8 -0.0455 -1.56 0.0266 0.73 0.0417 1.00 0.0360 0.79
ARCH0 0.0000 7.33 0.0000 13.09 0.0000 11.91 0.0000 14.54
ARCH1 0.8590 7.43 0.2184 3.17 0.3519 4.19 0.1438 2.26
Western NY Hudson River New York City Long Island95 
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